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EVENING THE ODDS: THE CASE FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARDS FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTION OF
TITLE VI AND TITLE VII DISPUTES
MARJORIE

A. SILVERt

In this Article Professor Silver addresses the shifting of attorneys'
fees in administrativelyresolved claims under Titles VI and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. ProfessorSilver begins by establishing Congress' commitment to provide informal methods for resolving disputes
under these statutes and its intent to use fee-shifting provisions as a
means of inducing effective access to counsel. She then discusses the
United States Supreme Court's decision in North Carolina Department
of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc. and contrastsits reasoningwith two earlier Court decisions dealing with administrative proceedings and attorneys' fees. Professor Silver argues that
Crest undermines Congress' intended designsfor both informal dispute
resolution andfee-shifting in civil rights enforcement. She then proposes
standards by which the Court might have evaluated whether separate
federal actions to recover attorneys'fees should lie for civil rights cases
resolved administratively. After counteringarguments againstfee recovery, the author calls on Congress to reverse the path the Supreme Court
has taken and to amend the relevant civil rightsfee-shifting statutes to
allow explicitly forfee awards to parties who have prevailed in administrative proceedings under those statutes.
INTRODUCTION

Commencing with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress has enacted numerous civil rights statutes with the overriding purpose of eradicating discrimination based on various invidious characteristics and providing redress to the
victims of that discrimination. 1 To effectuate the goals of nondiscrimination and
to provide meaningful remedies for acts of discrimination, Congress has employed various procedural devices and dispute resolution mechanisms. 2 Congress has granted litigants access to the federal courts to redress violations of
t Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. 1970, Brandeis University; J.D.
1973, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I wish to thank Professors Arthur Best, Larry Grosberg, Peter Margulies, and Don Zeigler for their valuable comments on a draft of this Article. I also
want to thank James McCarthy and Lisa Hartman for their excellent research assistance. Research
for this Article was funded by a New York Law School faculty research grant.

Copyright 1988 by Marjorie A. Silver.
1. See, ag., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tits. VI, VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, e (1982); Education
Amendments Act of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29

U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
2. See Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 482, 508-19 (1987).
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these civil rights, and has created as well administrative agencies empowered to
oversee the enforcement of nondiscrimination laws and to provide less formal
alternatives for the resolution of complaints and charges of discrimination by
aggrieved individuals. Additionally, to ensure that aggrieved individuals have
access to legal representation, Congress has promulgated over the years various
statutes that confer upon courts the power to award attorneys' fees to parties
who prevail on their civil rights claims. Prominent among such statutes are
section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 providing for fees to parties who4
prevail in employment discrimination actions or proceedings under Title VII,
and the 1976 amendments to section 1988, 5 providing for fees to parties who
prevail in actions or proceedings to enforce statutes enumerated in section 1988.
Among these enumerated statutes is Title VI, 6 which prohibits discrimination
based on race, ethnicity, and national origin in federally funded programs. As
with many remedial statutory schemes, the task has devolved on the courts to
clarify the scope and application of these fee-shifting statutes.
The courts have held that one may be a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the fee-shifting statutes by obtaining a favorable settlement, 7 and that one
may be awarded fees for obtaining relief even outside the contours of the federal
litigation in which fees are sought, when such litigation has served as a "catalyst" for obtaining relief.8 In 1980 the United States Supreme Court held in New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey9 that a federal court could award section
706(k) attorneys' fees to a party who had prevailed in mandatory state administrative proceedings under Title VII.1° After that decision, lower courts divided
on whether a court could award attorneys' fees under section 1988 to a party
who filed suit solely to recover such fees for prevailing at the administrative
level.11 In 1985 the Supreme Court held, in Webb v. Dyer County Board of
Education,12 that a prevailing party in a section 1983 action was not automatically entitled to section 1988 attorneys' fees for services performed in connection
with nonmandatory state administrative proceedings. 13 The following year, in
North CarolinaDepartment of Transportationv. Crest Street Community Coun3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).

4. Id. § 20M0e.
5. Id. § 1988.
6. Id. § 2000d.
7. E.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
8. Eg., Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor, 663 F.2d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 1981) (fees allowed where attorney's work in mooted Title VII action found to be catalyst to successful union
arbitration), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421,
429-30 (8th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff considered prevailing party if "lawsuit acted as a catalyst which
prompted [the defendant] to take action" to correct unlawful practice).

9. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
10. Id. at 71.
11. Compare, eg., Crest St. Community Council, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 769
F.2d 1025 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding district court could award fees for administrative resolution of
Title VI action), rev'd, 479 U.S. 6 (1986) with Latino Project, Inc. v. City of Camden, 701 F.2d 262
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding no fees for Title VI action resolved administratively).
12. 471 U.S. 234 (1985).
13. Id. at 243 (holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying § 1988 fees in

§ 1983 action for work performed in connection with nonmandatory state administrative
proceedings).
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cil, Inc., 1 4 the Court had the opportunity to decide whether section 1988 provided for attorneys' fees for the successful administrative resolution of a Title VI
complaint in a federal action filed solely to recover such fees. In Crest the Court
held that a prevailing party in a federal administrative proceeding under Title VI
had no right to attorneys' fees under section 1988 when recovery was sought in a
federal action fied solely to recover such fees. 15 Under the Court's holding, fees
are available to a party who fies a federal court action before obtaining a successful administrative resolution of his complaint, but not to a party who first
obtains a successful administrative resolution, and then files suit to recover attorneys' fees.
This Article demonstrates that the Court's reasoning in Crest is inconsistent
with its reasoning on section 706(k) in Carey 16 and that by denying fees in such
circumstances the Court has countermanded the congressional preference that
less formal agency processes be used where feasible to resolve discrimination
complaints. In addition, the Court's decision in Crest has frustrated congressional intent to provide effective access to counsel through the inducement of
fee-shifting. The Crest decision is one example among many in recent years of
retrenchment by the Court as well as by the executive branch in their commitment to civil rights enforcement. In this era of renewed awareness of pervasive
discrimination against minority groups, realization of the original and still extant goals of the civil rights laws requires that fees be available to prevailing
parties in cases resolved through congressionally created administrative proceedings that enforce laws such as Title VII and Title VI. 17 Part I of this Article
explores Congress' commitment to using agencies for the informal resolution of
disputes arising under Title VII and Title VI and recounts the historical development of civil rights fee-shifting statutes. Part II summarizes the Court's decisions in Crest and the two earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with attorneys'
fees for administrative proceedings-Carey' s and Webb. 1 9 Part III explains
how the Court's result in Crest was neither compelled by the language, nor consistent with the purpose, of section 1988, and was inconsistent with the Court's
prior decisions. It demonstrates that the result in Crest frustrated congressional
desire for consistent interpretation and application of the civil rights fee-shifting
statutes. The section concludes by articulating a standard for identifying those
14. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
15. Id. at 15.

16. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
17. Throughout this article, any discussion of Title VI (discrimination based on race, ethnicity
or national origin) is similarly applicable to Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1982) ("Title IX") (discrimination based on gender in educational programs) and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504") (discrimination based
on handicap). Each of these laws prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs and activities and is enforced through administrative procedures identical to those of Title VI. Issues concerning attorneys' fee-shifting are comparable for the three statutes. Title VI and Title IX are explicitly
included within § 1988's coverage. The 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act added a virtually identical attorneys' fee provision applicable to Section 504. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982). I refer
generally in the text only to Title VI not only as a shorthand reference to any of these, but also
because the Crest case involved a Title VI violation.
18. 447 U.S. 54.
19. 471 U.S. 234.
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administrative proceedings for which separate actions for fees should be authorized under the fee-shifting statutes. Part IV debunks various fallacious assumptions about awarding fees for Title VI cases resolved administratively. These
assumptions include the assertion that the absence of any requirement in Title
VI that a party must first pursue administrative remedies before filing suit suggests that the fee for administrative resolution should be treated differently than
under Title VII, which has such a requirement; that allowing suits for such fees
will increase the burden on the courts; that such suits will formalize informal
administrative processes and discourage settlement of disputes; and that private
attorneys are unnecessary at Title VI administrative proceedings. Part V proposes that to further its own declared goals for civil rights legislation Congress
should amend both sections 1988 and 706(k) to provide explicitly for federal
court fee awards to parties who have prevailed in Title VI and Title VII administrative proceedings.
I.

MECHANISMS FOR ERADICATING DISCRIMINATION: AGENCIES,
INFORMAL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES, AND FEE-SHIFTING

The comprehensive package of remedial measures that became the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was the result of recognition by both Congress and the President that invidious discrimination, largely discrimination against blacks, would
not be solved short of dramatic federal intervention. 20 The Act reinforced the
commitment to eradicate discrimination with the enforcement power of the
United States, enabling the Attorney General to bring suit to enforce the Act's
provisions. 2 1 Another key component of the Act was the inclusion of adminison informal, nonjudicial aptrative enforcement machinery and an emphasis
22
proaches for remedying discrimination.
20. Silver, supra note 2, at 485-86.
21. Titles II, III, IV, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 each explicitly empowers the
Attorney General to institute a civil suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C § 2000a-5 (1982) (Title II);
id. § 2000b (Title III); id. § 2000c-6 (Title IV); id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII). Title VI does so by
implication and as implemented by its regulations. Id. § 2000d-1; 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a) (1987).
22. See Silver, supra note 2, at 486-87; 499-500. Title II (public accommodations) provided
that an aggrieved individual could not bring any civil action under § 2000a-3(a) until 30 days after
notification to a state or locality with applicable law prohibiting such a practice; in the absence of
such a state or local law, the court in its discretion could refer the matter to the Community Relations Service established by Title X "for as long as the court believes there is a reasonable possibility
of obtaining voluntary compliance, but for not more than sixty days," with the possibility of an
extension of another 60 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(d) (1982). The Community Relations Service
was authorized to make full investigation of any such matter, hold any necessary hearings, and
"endeavor to bring about a voluntary settlement between the parties." Id. § 2000a-4. Title III (public facilities) neither creates an administrative enforcement mechanism nor mentions voluntary compliance. Id. § 2000b.
Title IV (public education; desegregation of public schools) authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Education to provide technical assistance to local governments and school boards to
assist them in implementing school desegregation plans, id. § 2000c-2, and authorizes financial
assistance as well for such purposes, id. § 2000c-3 to 5. Both Titles III and IV authorize the Attorney General to institute suit to enforce their provisions upon finding that the aggrieved individuals
are not themselves competent to do so. Id. §§ 2000b, 2000c-6.
Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in federally assisted
programs, id. § 2000d, and vests primary enforcement responsibility in each funding agency, id.
§ 2000d-l. It further provides that no action to terminate federal financial assistance, or any other
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Congress vested enforcement powers in administrative agencies primarily
for the traditional reasons it turns to agencies: expedience and expertise. 23 Relying on agencies to adjudicate controversies frees judicial resources and generally
incurs less cost and time than resolving a case through litigation. 24 Also, agencies specialize and thus develop sophistication and expertise less accessible to the
generalist branches of government.
Provisions for informal resolution of violations complement many of the
reasons for assigning initial enforcement to administrative agencies. "Voluntary
compliance," the term of art for such informal resolution, is more expedient,
more cost-effective, and less confrontational than formal alternatives, whether
such alternatives be judicial or administrative litigation. 25 Congress manifested
26
in the 1964 Act a definite preference for informal resolution where feasible.
Title VI's legislative history in particular underscores the congressional intent
that the "draconian remedy" of fund termination should serve as the stick to
induce voluntary compliance and nondiscrimination based on race, ethnicity,
and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal funds, so that

actual termination of federal financial assistance would be a rare, uncommon
occurrence.

27

But creating and funding enforcement agencies was only part of Congress'
effort to eradicate discrimination. Congress recognized that judicial redress
would be necessary when compliance problems could not be resolved administratively. 2 8 Originally, the plaintiff in a judicial action was likely to be the

United States itself; all the major provisions of the 1964 Act provided that the
United States might bring suit should it fail to resolve discrimination problems
informally. 29 Title VI gave the agency the option of bringing administrative
legal action, can be taken before the agency "has determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means." Id.
Title VII creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), id. § 2000e-5, and
empowers it to seek the elimination of unlawful practices through "informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion." Id. § 2000e-5(b).
23. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932) (upholding administrative factfinding because "[t]o hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a
prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact
which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially
assigned to that task"); S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 203 (2d ed. 1985).
24. Silver, supra note 2, at 495, 499.
25. Silver, supra note 2, at 560-62.
26. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974) ("Cooperation and voluntary
compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving [the goal of equal employment opportunity]."), cited in Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253, 1257 (2d Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); see also Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269
F. Supp. 346, 351 (M.D. Ala. 1967) ("philosophy of the [1964 Act] is to induce as much voluntary
compliance as possible").
27. See Silver, supra note 2, at 521-22.
28. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although some agencies
of the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited."
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976))).
29. Titles II, III, IV, VI, and VII all enable the Attorney General to institute suit if compliance
is not otherwise achieved. See supra note 22.
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proceedings or referring the matter to the Department of Justice.30 Only Titles
II and VII of the 1964 Act explicitly provided that an aggrieved individual, as

well as the United States, might bring suit herself.3 1 In fact, the lower courts
disagreed on whether an individual might bring a private right of action under

Title VI until the Supreme Court determined, in a series of cases commencing
33
32
with Cannon v. University of Chicago, that such a right existed.

In addition to being the only sections of the 1964 Act that created an explicit private right of action, only Titles II and VII originally provided for attorneys' fees to a prevailing party (other than the United States) in actions brought
3 5 they were the first
under those titles. 34 While not the first fee-shifting statutes,
36
to shift fees in any modem federal civil rights action.

In the years following the 1964 Act, numerous lower courts used a "private
30. Section 602 of the Act, provides, in part:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1)by
the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement.. . , or (2) by any
other means authorized by law ....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
By regulation, such other means includes referral to the Department of Justice "with a recommendation that appropriate proceedings be brought to enforce any rights of the United States under
any law of the United States (including other titles of the Act)." 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a) (1987).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1982) (discrimination in public accommodations); id. § 2000c.
5(f)(1) (discrimination in employment). Under Title VII, a charging party could ask for and receive
a notice of right to sue from the agency if the EEOC failed to resolve the problem within 180 days
from the filing of the charge and the EEOC, or, in the case of a respondent which is a governmental
entity, the Attorney General, has not filed a civil action within that time. Id. Title II, which vested
no enforcement authority in any agency other than the Department of Justice, provides that either
an aggrieved individual, id. § 2000a-3(a), or, in the case of pattern and practice discrimination, the
Attorney General, id. § 2000a-5(a), may bring suit in federal court. Title II explicitly disavows any
requirement of exhaustion of administrative or other remedies. Id. § 2000a-6(a). Under Title II,
however, the only remedy-other than attorneys' fees-is injunctive relief. Id. § 2000a-3(a).
32. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (establishing a private right of action under Title IX). The Court
proceeded to make clear that the same private rights of action also existed under other nondiscrimination statutes. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (private
action under Title VI); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 (1984) (private action
under Section 504).
The prior uncertainty regarding the existence of a private right of action under Titles VI, IX
and Section 504 is relevant to the analysis of whether § 1988 should be interpreted to apply to cases
resolved administratively, consistent with the Court's interpretation of § 706(k) in New York Gas.
light Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). See infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
33. Compare Smith v. United States Postal Serv., 742 F.2d 257, 258 (6th Cir. 1984) and Doe v.
New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies under Section 504 as prerequisite to prosecuting suit) with Whitaker v. Board of Higher
Educ. of the City of New York, 461 F. Supp. 99, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (not requiring exhaustion
under Section 504).
34. Tit. II, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b); tit. VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k).
35. See H. NEWBERG, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 28.01 (1986) (listing fee award statutes
dating back to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982)).
36. See id. Actually, the very first fee-shifting statute was the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16
Stat. 140 (repealed 1894), which protected voting rights. The causes of action established by these
provisions, however, were repealed in 1894. Act to Repeal Statutes Relating to Supervisors of Elections and Special Deputy Marshals, 28 Stat. 36 (1894); see S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5912. Such fee-shifting is in
counterpoint to the prevailing "American Rule," which provides, unless subject to a specific exception, that each party to litigation bears his own attorneys' fees, regardless of who prevails. See
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975).
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attorney general" theory to award fees to plaintiffs who prevailed in a variety of
public interest litigation. 37 That theory held that in order to encourage and

foster public interest litigation, prevailing parties should be allowed to recover
fees, not for their private gain, but for their service for the public good. Looking
to Congress' example in the fee-shifting statutes, these courts concluded that
effective redress of civil and environmental rights required effective access to
competent counsel which could be facilitated by awarding fees as part of the
remedy to prevailing plaintiffs.3 8 However the Supreme Court put an abrupt

in 1975 with its decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
halt to this movement
39
Wilderness SoCiety.
In Alyeska the Court held that only Congress, and not the courts, could
carve exceptions to the traditional American rule that each party in litigation

bears its own attorneys' fees.4° In that case the lower court relied on the "private attorney general" theory to award attorneys' fees to the Wilderness Society
as a prevailing plaintiff in litigation to halt construction of the Alaska pipeline.

While the Court did not denigrate the nobility of the lower court's aim, it proclaimed that such policy decisions were for the elected branch of government
41
and not for the courts.

One year later, in explicit response to the Alyeska decision, 42 Congress

passed the Civil Rights Attorney's fees Awards Act of 1976, amending section
1988. The Act provides as follows:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318,

or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion,
the United States, a reasonmay allow the prevailing party, other than
43
able attorney's fee as part of the costs.

The section 1988 fee-shifting provision was modeled on section 706(k), Title
37. See, eg., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Taylor
v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974); Fowler v. Schwartzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974);
Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson,
494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Wilderness Soe'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc),
rev'd sub nom, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Morales v.
Haines, 486 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 282-85 (Marshall, J.,dissenting)
(arguing that guidelines for proper application of "private attorney general" theory had been suggested in a number of prior Supreme Court decisions).
38. See, eg., Souza, 512 F.2d at 1138; Taylor, 503 F.2d at 905.
39. 421 U.S. 240.
40. Id. at 269 (1975). The Court relied on an 1853 federal statute that excluded attorneys' fees
from the costs that might be taxed against a losing party in a federal suit. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920,
1923(a) (1982).
41. While acknowledging that Congress had "acquiesced" in judicial crafting of some exceptions to the traditional rule, the Court emphasized that at no time had Congress "retracted, repealed
or modified the limitations on taxable fees contained in the 1853 statute and its successors," nor had
it "extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted." Aleyeska, 421 U.S. at 260.
42. See, eg., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 3.
43. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). The
language of the Act as originally enacted varied somewhat from that cited, which reflects Congress'
1980 amendments enacted to have § 1988 conform to provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982)).
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VII's fee-shifting component. 44 Its import was to provide effective access to redress of violations of the enumerated civil rights statutes. 4 5 A House Report
described the purpose of section 1988 as follows:
The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes depends
largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the
United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many instances where these laws are violated, it
is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will remain a
meaningless right. Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights
violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their
cases to the courts. In authorizing an award of reasonable attorney's
fees [section 1988] is designed to give such persons effective access to
process where their grievances can be resolved according to
the judicial
46
law.

By enacting section 1988, Congress endeavored to facilitate the redress of
civil rights violations, whether such violations were the result of discrimination
forbidden by Congressional statutes, as in the case of Title IX and Title VI, or
the transgression of other constitutionally or statutorily secured rights, as in the
case of the reconstruction era civil rights laws. Finding no reason for differential
treatment, Congress strove to harmonize access to counsel under these statutes
47
with that previously available under Title VII and other fee-shifting statutes.
Neither the fee-shifting statutes themselves, nor the legislative history surrounding the enactment of either the 1964 Civil Rights Act or the 1976 amendments makes clear what the relationship is, or should be, among the
administrative agencies that enforce civil rights, the goal of promoting informal
resolution of discrimination disputes, and the provision of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. Further, case law sheds no light on how these three elements
complement or contradict each other. The statutes are clear that fees are available to prevailing parties in federal litigation under Title VI and Title VII. The
legislative history is clear that one need not have obtained a favorable judgment
in order to be a "prevailing party" within the terms of the statute: a settlement
in which one obtains all or part of the relief sought suffices. 48 What was left
44. "It is intended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee

provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 4; see Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 4).
45. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 2, 6; H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 28, at 1.
46. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 28, at 1.
47. Congress has enacted anywhere from 100, see Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 562 (1986), to 200 fee-shifting statutes, see Larson, The Origins and
History of Attorneys' Fees Law, in COURT AWARDS Or ATrORNEYS' FEES LITIGATING ANTITRUST,

CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SECURITIES CASES 1, 30 (PLI 1987); see also 131 CONG.
REc. 21,390 (1985) (statement of Sen. Lowell Weicker concerning EHA Attorney's Fees Amendment) (over 130 fee-shifting statutes). As pointed out in S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 3-4,
every major civil rights law since 1964 contains, or has been amended to contain, provisions for feeshifting. See, eg., Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, § 811, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982); Emergency
School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1982); Equal Employment Amendments of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1982); Voting Rights Act Extension of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1982).
48. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 5, cited in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129

(1980).
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unclear in the legislative history, and thus forms the focus of the current inquiry,
is whether attorneys' fees were to be available for work done at the administrative level and, if so, whether such fees were available in a suit filed solely to
recover fees for a matter resolved administratively. The Court made clear in
Alyeska that answering that question was solely a matter of ascertaining congressional intent. Divining that intent was the Court's task in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,49 Webb v. Dyer County Board of Education,50 and
North CarolinaDepartment of Transportationv. Crest Street Community Coun51

cil, Inc.

II.

A.

THE CASES: CAREY, WEBB, AND CREST

52
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey

In 1980 the Court was called upon to decide whether the attorneys' fees
provision of Title VII, section 706(k), extended to state administrative and judicial proceedings. In Carey plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the New York Gaslight
Club denied her a position as a cocktail waitress because of her race. 53 As required by Title VII, the EEOC in turn referred her complaint to the New York
State Division of Human Rights. 54 After an investigation during which plaintiff
was represented by private counsel, the state agency found probable cause to
believe that the Club had discriminated against Carey as alleged. Efforts at conciliation failed. A state administrative hearing found discrimination and ordered
the club to offer Carey employment and back pay. Inasmuch as the state agency
had no authority to order attorneys' fees, none were awarded.55 While this determination was on state appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) began its proceedings and, based largely on the state findings, also
found probable cause. Conciliation attempts failed and on July 13, 1977, plaintiff was issued a notice of right to sue. 56 On August 26 the state appeal board
affirmed the state's findings, and the club appealed to the New York Supreme
Court. Plaintiff cross-petitioned for enforcement of the state agency decision.
On September 30 plaintiff fied suit in federal district court under Title VII,
seeking damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. On November 3 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the state agency determination. 57 In a February 3, 1978, conference in federal court, the club
agreed that if the New York Court of Appeals denied their motion for leave to
49. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).

50. 471 U.S. 234 (1985).
51. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
52. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
53. Id. at 56.
54. Id. at 56-57. Section 706(c) requires the EEOC to refer complaints to state fair employment
agencies that have jurisdiction and meet certain criteria.
55. Id. at 57. The New York Human Rights law did not authorize an award of attorneys' fees
for work done at either state administrative or judicial proceedings. Id at 67 n.7.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Id.
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appeal, they would comply with the Division's order. That court did so one
week later. The sole remaining issue, then, was plaintiff's request for attorneys'
fees for the time spent in all proceedings.
The district court denied the fee request, holding that the fortuity of the
filing of a protective suit in federal court did not make the defendants liable for
plaintiff's representation costs in the state proceedings.5 8 The court also concluded that plaintiff could have pursued her state administrative remedies without the expense of private counsel, since state law provided that division
attorneys would present the case in support of the complaint to the hearing examiner.5 9 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. 6° The court framed
the issue as "whether section 706(k) encompasses fee awards to complaining
parties who succeed at a step in the statutory scheme before they are forced to
litigate their claims in federal court."' 61 The court examined a variety of factors
and concluded that one who prevailed on her complaint in state administrative
proceedings under Title VII was entitled to recover attorneys' fees just as one
would who prevailed in federal court.62
The Supreme Court agreed. 63 It examined the words of the statute and
found the language unambiguous. 64 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
stated that the inclusion of the word "proceedings" left "little doubt" that fee
awards for services performed in proceedings other than court actions were
available under section 706(k). 6 5 Noting that the contemporaneous language in
Title II, the public accommodations section of the 1964 Act, 66 created no comparable administrative machinery, and that its fee-shifting provision was identical to that of Title VII except that Title II's contained no reference to
"proceedings," the Court concluded that the words "or proceeding" in section
67
706(k) were not "mere surplusage."
The question of whether section 706(k) applied to required proceedings
before federal administrative agencies had been answered in the affirmative by
all the courts of appeals that had considered the question. 68 The Court found
nothing in the statute to suggest that Congress intended to make a distinction
between federal and state proceedings 69 and found, instead, reason to conclude
58. 458 F. Supp. 79, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S.

54 (1980).
59. Id. at 81.
60. Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 54

(1980).
61. Id. at 1257.
62. Id. at 1260; see Carey, 447 U.S. at 60.
63. Carey, 447 U.S. at 63.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 61.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1982).
67. Carey, 447 U.S. at 61.
68. Id. at 61 n.2. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether
attorneys' fees were awardable for required proceedings before the EEOC, see Parker v. Califano,
561 F.2d 320, 324 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but since Carey it has been assumed that such is the case.
See Skinner v. E.E.O.C., 551 F. Supp. 333, 337 (1982); Porter v. District of Columbia, 502 F. Supp.
271, 273 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
69. Carey, 447 U.S. at 61-62.
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that "proceedings" was intended to refer to either. 70
Heeding the congressional intent to facilitate the bringing of complaints to
redress discrimination, the Court concluded that permitting an attorneys' fee
award to a party who prevailed at the state or local administrative level would
further this goal, and that a contrary rule that would make the complainant bear
the costs of mandatory state and local proceedings would inhibit the enforcement of a meritorious claim. 71 The Court thus concluded that "section
706(f)(1)'s authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit solely
to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local proceedings." 72 Justice Stevens offered a concurring opinion in which he expressed
doubt as to whether Congress intended in section 706 to authorize a federal
action solely to recover attorneys' fees incurred in either mandatory or optional
state proceedings, but he asserted the question was not presented by the case at
hand since Carey's federal suit was filed before the case was finally resolved at
the state level.7 3 To Stevens, it was not clear that a statute that empowered a
"court" to award fees authorized the court to award fees when no federal litiga74
tion was necessary to resolve the underlying merits of the dispute. Thus, Justice Stevens limited his concurrence to agreeing that recovery for attorneys' fees
was authorized for work performed at administrative proceedings that were pre75
requisite to a court action.
Carey established the application of section 706(k) to Title VII plaintiffs
who prevailed in related state and local proceedings. Whether the Court would
reach a similar result when faced with a comparable question under section 1988
was first presented as an issue five years later in Webb v. Dyer County Board of
Education.76 In Webb the Court was called upon to decide whether fees were
awardable under section 1988 to prevailing parties in a section 1983 federal
70. Id. at 62.
71. Id. at 63.
72. Id. at 66 (emphasis added). The Court dismissed several arguments made by defendants,
including the argument that the state agency provided counsel to present the case at the administrative hearing. The Court noted that at the time of the state hearing in this case, "[c]omplainants were
'encouraged' to obtain private counsel due to a growing caseload and staff limitations." Id. at 69.
It is thus obvious that the assistance provided a complainant by the Division attorney is not
fully adequate, and that the attorney has no obligation to the complainant as a client. In
fact, at times the position of the Division may be detrimental to the interests of the complainant and to enforcement of federal rights.
Id. at 70.
73. Id. at 71-72 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 72 (Stevens, J., concurring). This opinion paved the way for Stevens to join the
majority in Crest. See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text. He also wrote the majority opinion
in Webb. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
75. Carey, 447 U.S. at 72-73 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices White and Rehnquist dissented
without original opinion, based on Judge Mulligan's dissent from the judgment of the court of appeals. Id. at 71 (Rehnquist & White, JJ., dissenting). Judge Mulligan had taken issue with the
circuit court majority's opinion that disallowing fees would encourage needless litigation. Carey, 598
F.2d at 1260-64. To the contrary, Judge Mulligan asserted that allowing fees for cases settled administratively would in fact encourage federal suits solely for the purpose of recovering fees. Judge
Mulligan argued additionally that remuneration for state proceedings should be determined by state
law, and that New York's provision for agency counsel was adequate to vindicate plaintiff's rights.
Id.
76. 471 U.S. 234 (1985).
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court action for work performed in related state administrative proceedings.77
B. Webb v. Dyer County Board of Education 78
Webb asked whether the district court could exclude time spent by plaintiff's attorney pursuing optional administrative proceedings before a school
board from the calculation of a "reasonable fee" in a subsequent successful section 1983 action. 79 Webb, an elementary school teacher, claimed that he was
wrongfully dismissed, and invoked his rights under Tennessee law to a hearing
to challenge the cause of his dismissal. 80 His attorney argued to the school
board that the Board had denied Webb the right to a pretermination hearing and
that racial discrimination was one of several reasons for Webb's dismissal. After
a series of hearings, the Board adhered to its original decision. 81 Webb's attorney subsequently commenced a section 1983 action in federal court, alleging
that the Board's action was unconstitutional and violated several civil rights
laws, including section 1983. The suit was eventually settled by consent order,
but the matter of attorneys' fees was reserved for future resolution by the parties
or the court.8 2 Negotiations between the parties on the fee were unsuccessful,
the school board claiming petitioner was not entitled to recover fees for counsel's
services in the administrative proceedings. 83 The district court agreed and the
84
circuit court affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a conflict on the availability of attorneys' fees under section 1988 for time spent in state administrative
proceedings prior to filing a federal civil rights action. 85 Petitioner relied heavily
on Carey to support his claim for fees. The Court found Carey inapplicable
because of the absence of any requirement in section 1983 comparable to that in
Title VII requiring a claimant to pursue state administrative remedies prior to
filing suit in federal court. 86 The Court reasoned further that section 1988 only
authorized a fee in an "action or proceeding" to enforce section 1983, and
"[a]dministrative proceedings established to enforce tenure rights created by
state law simply are not any part of the proceedings to enforce section 1983."87
The Court thus concluded that the district court's denial of time spent on administrative proceedings as not relating directly to the litigation was "well
77. Section 1983 is one of the several statutes enumerated in section 1988. See supra note 43
and accompanying text.
78. 471 U.S. 234 (1985).
79. Id. at 236.
80. Id. Under Tenessee law, no teacher may be dismissed without cause. TENN. CODE. ANN.

§ 49-5-511(a) (1983). Any teacher who challenges the grounds for his dismissal has a right to a
hearing. Id. § 49-5-512.
81. Webb, 471 U.S. at 236-37.
82. Id. at 237.
83. Id. at 238-39.
84. Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 715 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 471 U.S. 234
(1985).
85. Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 466 U.S. 935 (1984).
86. Webb, 471 U.S. at 240.
87. Id. at 241.
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88
within the range of reasonable discretion."

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, issued an opinion concurring

in part and dissenting in part. His principal disagreement with the majority was
the latter's failure to remand the matter to the district court for a determination

of whether any of the attorney's work performed at the administrative level was
compensable under the proper standard.8 9 Justice Brennan's standard for

whether compensation was awardable under section 1988 was first, whether the
collateral proceeding for which fees were sought was an "action or proceeding"
within the meaning of section 1988 and second, whether the work in the collateral proceeding "demonstrably contributed 'to enforce[ment of] a provision' of
the civil rights laws." 90 Carey, according to Brennan, resolved the first part of

the inquiry: state administrative proceedings may be "actions or proceedings"
within the meaning of section 1988, since section 706(k) was the prototype for
section 1988.91 The exhaustion requirement in Title VII was irrelevant in defining "action or proceeding" because like words presumably have like meaning.
Its relevance, rather, was in determining whether the second part of the inquiry
was satisfied: whether such proceedings made a "demonstrable contribution" to

enforcing petitioner's section 1983 claim. 9 2 Proceedings, said Brennan,

although not mandatory under the federal scheme, may still contribute to con93
gressional design.
Justice Brennan further recognized a distinction between wasteful, duplica-

tive processes, and those which might serve as satisfactory substitutes for, or
supplements to, the judicial processes designed to vindicate federal civil rights.
Depriving a prevailing party of compensation for the latter, said Brennan, might
create an unwanted incentive for filing federal litigation whenever possible,94 in

order for a complainant "to steer himself into section 1988's safe harbor."

It is evident that the Webb majority saw a clear distinction between the
88. Id. at 244. The Court suggested, but did not hold, that it also would have been reasonable
for the district court to have determined that some portion of the time spent on the administrative
proceeding would have been properly reimbursable as related to the litigation. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (time compensable under § 1988 is that "reasonably expended on
the litigation" (emphasis added by Webb majority)). Instead, the district court took an all-or-nothing
approach and the majority did not challenge that approach. Webb, 471 U.S. at 243.
89. Webb, 471 U.S. at 245 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 246 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id at 246 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing relevant legislative history); see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
92. Id at 247-48 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]ollateral proceedings
may frequently accord with Congress' general intent for courts to 'use that combination of Federal
law, common law and State law as will be best adapted to the object of the civil rights laws.'"
(quoting S. REP. No 1011, supra note 36, at 3 n.1)).
94. Webb, 471 U.S. at 249-50. Brennan devised a three-part test for ascertaining when state
administrative work is "useful and of a type ordinarily necessary" to warrant a § 1988 fee award.
First, the court must conclude that the administrative work for which fees were sought was "independently reasonable." Second, the court must find that such work, or a discrete portion of it,
"significantly contributed to the success of the federal-court outcome and eliminated the need for
work that otherwise would have been required in connection with the litigation." Third, fees should
be awarded only to the extent that the "administrative work was equally or more cost-effective" than
comparable litigation work would have been. Id. at 253. In doing such an analysis, the district court
was to have broad discretion. Id at 254. Brennan then applied his analysis to the facts of Webb and
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mandatory nature of the state proceedings under Title VII in Carey and the
optional state proceedings pursued by plaintiff in Webb. Webb of course did not
raise the question of whether administrative processes which obviated the need
for federal court action should be compensable under section 1988. This question, presented not in terms of optional state proceedings, but rather in terms of
nonmandatory federal processes, was posed squarely by Crest.
of Transportation v. Crest Street
C. North Carolina Department
95
Community Council, Inc.
In September 1978 respondents, Crest Street Community Council, Inc.
(Crest), filed an administrative complaint with the United States Department of
Transportation. The complaint challenged the North Carolina Department of
Transportation's proposed extension of a federally funded major expressway
through a predominantly black neighborhood in Durham, and alleged that such
action would violate Title VI. 9 6 In February 1980 the federal department's Director of Civil Rights determined that probable cause existed to believe that the
state department's plan would violate Title VI, and urged that department to
negotiate with Crest to resolve the alleged violation. 97 The federal department
was proceeding against the backdrop of a 1973 injunction against any construction of the highway extension, issued in an unrelated federal district court action
based on alleged violations of federal transportation and environmental laws. 98
In February 1982 Crest, the state department, and the City of Durham reached
a preliminary agreement on the Title VI claim. 99 Subsequently, in August of
that year, the state department moved to dissolve the district court injunction.100 In response, Crest moved to intervene in that action and filed a proposed complaint alleging the Title VI violations. While Crest's petition was
pending, the district court resolved its suit by entering a consent judgment dissolving its injunction and dismissing the action and Crest's Title VI claims on
condition that the state department implement what the parties called the Final
Mitigation Plan.10 1
Crest then filed a new action for section 1988 attorneys' fees for counsel's
services consisting of more than 12,000 hours spent over five years in preparing
the administrative complaint, assisting in the federal Department of Transportasuggested that at least some portion of the work done at the state administrative level was entitled to
compensation, id. at 254-58, and thus criticized the majority for its failure to remand. Id. at 259-60.
95. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
96. Id. at 9.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 9. The injunction was issued in ECOS, Inc. v. Brinegar, No. C-352-D.72 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 20, 1973).
99. Crest, 479 U.S. at 10.

100. Id.
101. Id. The Final Mitigation Plan spelled out what measures the City and the state department
of transportation would take to mitigate the detrimental effect of the proposed highway on the Crest

Street community.
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tion's investigation, and negotiating a resolution of the dispute.10 2 The district
court granted summary judgment for the North Carolina Department of Transportation and dismissed the action.10 3 The court agreed with the petitioners
that section 1988 provided no basis for Crest to recover attorneys' fees from the
state department.'1 4
A unanimous Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.' 0 5 Finding guidance in Carey, the circuit court concluded that Crest
was a "'prevailing party' in a 'proceeding to enforce... title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' "106 and thus within the ambit of section 1988.107 Viewing
the phrase "action or proceeding" to naturally connote "civil action" and "administrative proceeding," the court concluded that the administrative proceedings before the federal department were the kinds of proceedings contemplated
08
by section 1988's language.'
The Supreme Court reversed, l0 9 hinging its decision on the fact that the
action in which the fees were sought was not, in the "plain language" of section
1988, an "action or proceeding to enforce" a civil rights law listed in that section. 110 It bolstered its conclusion by reference to section 1988's legislative history. The Court found that all of the references in the senate and house reports
were to courts and judicial proceedings, and, while not requiring a judicial judgment for recovering section 1988 fees, Congress did contemplate at least the
filing of a judicial complaint on the merits. 1
The Court did not endeavor to distinguish an action for fees under Title VII
and section 706(k) from an action for fees under Title VI and section 1988.112
Rather, it dealt with the statement in Carey that "section 706(f)(1)'s authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit solely to obtain an awardof
attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local proceedings,"113 by con1 14
demning it as dictum, noting Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in that case.
102. Id. at 10. According to the Court, "[t]he result of this diligent labor was both substantial

and concrete." Id.
103. Crest St. Community Council, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 598 F. Supp. 258
(E.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 1025 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
104. Crest, 769 F.2d at 1033-34.
105. 769 F.2d 1025 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
106. Id. at 1028-29 (quoting § 1988).
107. Id. at 1028.
108. Id. at 1029 ('Some of the substantive provisions listed in § 1988 explicitly contemplate civil
actions in state or federal court, and some, such as Title VI, explicitly contemplate initial administrative proceedings with possible later judicial review." (emphasis added)). Referring to the Court's
analysis in Carey interpreting the identical language, the court acknowledged Congress' intent to
pattern § 1988 on § 706(k), and concluded that "Congress' expressed policy of uniformity among the
fee statutes [would] be furthered by adopting the same construction of the same language." Id.
109. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
110. Id. at 11-12, 16.
111. Id. at 12-13 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36; H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 28).
112. The Court appropriately acknowledged the parallels between the two attorneys' fees statutes. Id. at 13-14.
113. Carey, 447 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
114. Crest, 479 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Whether
Congress intended to authorize a separate federal action solely to recover costs, including attorney's
fees... is not only doubtful but is a question that is plainly not presented by this record.")).
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It limited Carey to its particular facts, since a Title VII action was filed before
the ultimate resolution of the case in the state proceedings. Even if it made
greater sense to have the same rule regardless of whether the suit was filed before
or after the admistrative resolution, said the Court, "'[t]he short answer is that
Congress did not write the statute that way.' "11IS
Furthermore, the Court suggested that a distinction between cases resolved
administratively before a suit on the merits is filed and cases resolved administratively only after the suit on the merits is filed is not as anomalous as preceding
majorities of the Court might have thought, because a fee award depends not
only on the results obtained, but on what steps were taken to achieve those results. 116 The Crest majority believed it "entirely reasonable" to restrict fee
awards to plaintiffs who had found it necessary to file in court in order to obtain
relief. 117 The Court rejected the suggestion in Carey that the result reached in
Crestwould contribute to the proliferation of unnecessary lawsuits aimed merely
at obtaining attorneys' fees. 118 Rather, the Crest majority embraced its assertion
in Webb that competent counsel will not be influenced by the application of the
fee-shifting statutes in making decisions about whether to file suits in court.1 19
The Court reaffirmed that a district court may award fees for time spent on
administrative proceedings to enforce the civil rights claim that occur prior to
1 20
the filing of the court suit.
Justice Brennan again dissented, this time joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, 12 1 asserting that the majority's decision ignored the Court's past decisions, the purpose of section 1988, and the burden the decision placed on the
district courts. First, Brennan argued that nothing in the language of section
1988 compelled the Court's result.1 22 An action filed to recover attorneys' fees,
although solely fied to recover fees, is nonetheless a part of the "proceeding to
enforce" the civil rights claim, the right to fees being an important part of that
1 23
claim.
Second, Brennan argued that the Court's position betrayed the purpose un115. Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 79 (1984)) ("The legislative history
clearly envisions that attorney's fees would be awarded for proceedings only when those proceedings
are part of or followed by a lawsuit.")

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Carey, 447 U.S. at 66 n.6.
119. The Court stated:
Upon reflection... we think that the better view was expressed by our conclusion in Webb
...that "competent counsel will be motivated by the interests of the client to pursue...
administrative remedies when they are available and counsel believes that they may prove
successful." An interpretation of § 1988 cannot be based on the assumption that "an attorney will advise the client to forgo an available avenue of relief solely because § 1988 does
not provide for attorney's fees ......
Crest, 479 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Webb, 471 U.S. at 241, n.15).
120. Crest, 479 U.S. at 15. Relying on dicta to that effect in Webb, 471 U.S. at 243, recovery
could be had even when the prior proceeding was not one specifically to enforce one of the civil
rights laws enumerated in § 1988. Crest, 479 U.S. at 15.
121. Crest, 479 U.S. at 16.
122. Id. at 17.
123. Id. at 17-18.
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derlying section 1988-the promotion of uniform enforcement of the federal
civil rights acts for all citizens. 124 He noted that important civil rights are often,
but not always, vindicated in administrative proceedings. 12 5 Because Congress
recognized that providing a right without the ability to vindicate that right is
12 6
meaningless, it provided for attorneys' fees after the Court's Alyeska decision.
Brennan found the majority's decision irreconcilable with the Court's reasoning in Carey and its subsequent reaffirmation of Carey 127 in White v. New
Hampshire.128 Furthermore, he rejected the majority's conviction that its decision would not result in unnecessary litigation. 129 He believed that where there
is no exhaustion requirement-and there is none under Title VI- complainants
would file suit just to protect a section 1988 claim. Further, denying fees to a
plaintiff who succeeds at the agency proceedings while granting fees to a plaintiff
who succeeds only in court, would be to treat similarly situated persons disparately. 130 While stopping short of suggesting that counsel would refuse to take
on matters for which the administrative route is indicated, Brennan found likely
that given the absence of any exhaustion route, counsel would either file a protective lawsuit or forgo the administrative route entirely, a result inconsistent
13 1
with sound policy.
Justice Brennan did not go as far as he might have. Not only is the majority's decision in Crest inconsistent with sound policy, it violates the policy Congress has in fact chosen in erecting a strong administrative and informal
compliance structure in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Congress not only tolerates
attempted administrative resolution; it affirmatively encourages such an approach. Congress did not address this while enacting section 1988-as discussed
in Part III, Congress seems to have given little thought to fees for the administrative processes-but Congress' commitment to administrative enforcement of
the civil rights laws is manifest in the language and history of Title VI and Title
VII and the procedures available for their enforcement. 132 The result reached
by the majority in Crest thus frustrates the intent of Congress that both formal
and less formal means be used to eradicate discrimination and vindicate discriminatory acts and further disrupts congressional desire that the civil rights feeshifting statutes be interpreted and applied consistently and uniformly.
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 21.
128. 455 U.S. 445, 451-52 n.13 (1982) (Carey applies to suits filed solely to recover fees).
129. Crest, 479 U.S. at 21.
130. Id. at 22 (quoting Blow v. Lascaris, 523 F. Supp. 913, 917 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Unfairness
results when 'complainants with meritorious claims who succeed in ... administrative proceedings

are denied any possible action for attorney's fees in federal court, while those claimants with equally
or less meritorious claims who lose in administrative proceedings but happen to prevail in federal
court are granted attorney's fees.' "), aff'd, 668 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 914
(1982)).
131. "Initial resort to the administrative forum and the settlement of claims by the agency
should be encouraged, not discouraged." Id. at 25; see also Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 333
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (not allowing fees for work done at administrative level "would penalize the lawyer
for his pre-trial effectiveness and his resultant conservation of judicial time").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
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III.

THE ROLE FOR THE COURT: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING AND
CONSISTENCY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES

The Carey/Webb/Crest trilogy demonstrates that the Court has failed to
reconcile the goal of the federal civil rights laws to eradicate discrimination and

provide effective redress for acts of discrimination with Congress' provision for
both administrative enforcement mechanisms and attorneys' fees to prevailing
civil rights plaintiffs. This has led to conflicting focuses and analyses in the vari-

ous majority opinions that raise these issues, resulting in the lack of a consistent,
reasoned

approach
133

to

awarding

attorneys'

fees

for

cases

resolved

administratively.
Undoubtedly, much of the Court's difficulty results from a lack of any clear
declaration of congressional intent. The legislative history of both sections 1988
and 706(k) shows that apparently few, if any, legislators ever thought about
whether fees should be available for work done and/or for cases resolved at the
administrative level.13 4 The Court's task therefore is to address the question
133. Inconsistency in its approach to attorneys' fees cases reaches more broadly than issues revolving around fees for administrative resolutions. Recently, in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clear Air, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987), the Court reversed the district court's adjustment of the lodestar to compensate for what the district court found to be the riskiness of the litiga-

tion. A plurality of the Court, consisting of Justices White, Powell, and Scalia, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that § 304 of the Clean Air Act should not be construed to permit enhancement of a
reasonable lodestar fee to compensate for an attorney's assuming the risk of loss and of nonpayment.
Id. at 3088. Justice O'Connor concurred separately, asserting that Congress did not intend to foreclose consideration of contingency factors in setting a reasonable fee under § 304(d), but concurred
that the district court had misused this approach in this case. Id. at 3089-91.
Dissenting Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens argued forcefully that the plurality opinion disserved Congress' purpose in making attorney services available to public interest
cases in otherwise nonlucrative litigation, especially litigation for injunctive or declaratory relief.
The plurality's view, they argue, would place the entire burden of pursuing such litigation on the
shoulders of the 600 public interest lawyers in the 90 public interest law centers in the country, to the
exclusion of the other 400,000 lawyers who, it may be assumed, using a simple market analysis
would choose to pursue private litigation in which they could obtain greater compensation for contingency factors. Id. at 3096.
See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), which held that no attorneys' fees could be
sought under § 1988 for a § 1983 action based on an Education for Handicapped Children Act
(EHA) claim, since the ERA made no provision for attorneys' fees. The Court concluded that in
passing the EHA subsequent to § 1988, Congress intended to take any right based on discrimination
in educational placement of handicapped children out of the purview of § 1988, perhaps, speculated
the majority, to save money. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1030-31. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
dissented, finding the majority's result inconsistent with Congressional intent. Congress disagreed
with the majority's evaluation of what it had intended to do and moved swiftly-congressionally
speaking-to pass remedial legislation to overrule Smith. See The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1985); infra text accompanying notes 171-72.
134. The legislative history to the 1976 amendments to § 1988 is not helpful; there is no explicit
discussion of whether fees were to be available for administrative proceedings. See Webb, 471 U.S.
at 241 n.16, (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supranote 36, at 2, 6; H.R. REP. No. 1558, supranote 28, at 1)
(purpose of § 1988 was to promote enforcement of civil rights through judicial process). The Webb
majority's use of the legislative history is somewhat misleading. While it is indisputably accurate to
say that a purpose of the legislation was to provide effective access to judicial enforcement of federal
civil rights, one can hardly read the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to abandon
its traditional preference for administrative resolution of discrimination claims and voluntary compliance. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27. Further, the Senate Report, on a page not referred to in Webb, declares the purpose of § 1988 to be to "give the federal courts discretion to
award attorneys' fees ...

to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws ...

and to achieve

consistency." S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 1. The primary concern appeared to be the
equalization of the opportunity to litigate, not the encouragement to use it. This purpose is reflected
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that Congress failed to think about adequately. 13 5
A.

Reviewing Ambiguous Statutory Enactments-Generally

How should the Court review an ambiguous congressional enactment? If
Congress has not spoken clearly on the fee question, why should not the burden
be on Congress to clarify any ambiguities, rather than on the Court to do what
in the passages cited by the Webb majority: the Senate report asserts that the potential of fee awards
is "essential to a meaningful opportunity" to litigate the various actions encompassed by § 1988,
because "in many cases... the citizen who must sue has little or no money to hire an attorney." Id.
at 2. The Court's citation does not support its conclusion that § 1988 was designed to promote
litigation, because, although the report mentions "private action through the courts," it states this
will only be necessary "in some cases." Id. at 6. The conclusion that Congress' focus was on equal
access, as opposed to affirmative encouragement of litigation, is especially compelling in light of the
timing of the proposed legislation, following on the heels of the Court's decision in Alyeska, see supra
notes 39-42 and accompanying text, which had effectively cut off the equal access Congress endeavored to restore. See Crest, 479 U.S. at 25 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The congressional purpose
visible in the legislative history of § 1988 militates in favor of allowing an individual action for fees
following success in an administrative proceeding to enforce one of the civil rights statutes covered
by § 1988.").
As for the legislative history surrounding § 706(k), see Carey, 447 U.S. at 63 ("sparse" legislative history only has reference to lawsuits and judicial actions). Senator Humphrey, in his omnibus
discussion of Title VII, characterized § 706(k) as a provision designed "to make it easier for a plaintiff... to bring a meritorious suit." 110 CONG. REc. 14,214 (1964) (emphasis added). The limited
discussion by other senators followed a similar vein; to the extent § 706(k) was discussed, it was in
terms of facilitating "lawsuits," and never in terms of nonjudicial proceedings. See, eg., id. (remarks
of Sen. Pastore).
See also Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 333-39 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (attorneys' fees awardable
under § 706(k) to federal employee for work done at administrative level) (Appendix). The Appendix discusses § 706(k)'s ambiguous legislative history. Perhaps the most damaging statement concerning whether § 706(k) applies to attorneys' fees for work done at the administrative level is from
the 1972 debates to amend Title VII to give EEOC enforcement authority, made on the floor by
Senator Mondale, who proposed a substitute amendment:
The underlying law, which is unchanged by the bill, provides that in any action or proceeding under this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party-other than
the Commission or the United States-a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the cost; and
the Commission and the United States shall be liable for the costs the same as a private
person. The proposed substitute would liberalize that provision in two basic respects.
First, it would add authority to award costs to the prevailing party with respect to the cost
of a proceeding before the Commission. The underlying law to which I have referred does
not permit the awarding offees with respect to proceedings before the Commission. So it
liberalizes the fee awarding powers in that respect ....
118 CONG. REc. at 1845 (emphasis added), cited in Parker,561 F.2d at 337. The Appendix notes
that Senator Mondale's understanding seemed to be at variance with that of Senator Gambrell, who
made reference, in another context, to the Commission awarding fees:
Under the present law, as I understand it, [when a small businessman agrees to a consent
order against him], the Commission could not allow expenses and attorneys' fees, because
the respondent in the case would not have been a prevailing party. This amendment says
that so long as he has conducted his defense in a manner consistent with the purposes of
the act itself, he can and in fact must be paid his expenses and attorneys' fees.
118 CONG. REC. at 1833, cited in Parker,561 F.2d at 337. The Appendix also points out that "legislative statements subsequent to passage of a given act do not deserve weight equal to that of statements made contemporaneously with passage." Parker,561 F.2d at 339.
135. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 15 (1921):
"The fact is," says Gray in his lectures on the "Nature and Sources of the Law," [Sec. 370,
p. 165] "that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no
meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when
what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the legislature did mean on a point,
which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not
present to its mind, if the point had been present."
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Congress failed to do? The answer is at least twofold. First, it is impossible for
Congress to think about every aspect and ramification of a particular piece of
legislation it enacts.1 36 Courts must frequently undertake to fill in the interstices
of a legislative scheme to implement congressional purpose. 137 Second, given

the political realities of our legislative process, it is just plain difficult for any
legislation to get passed, even when there appears to be a majoritarian consensus
that it should be, and legislative correction of errant Supreme Court decisions is
an event too rare to be counted on for interstitial clarification of extant
legislation.138
This is not an instance in which the Court can defer to an administrative
agency the question of whether fees should be available for cases resolved administratively. In cases where Congress has created an administrative agency to
implement a statutory scheme, the Court has stated that reviewing courts should
defer to a rational interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency, even if

the interpretation changes from administration to administration, and even if the
interpretation is influenced by current policy and informed by current political
realities. In his concurring opinion in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 139 Justice Rehnquist said that
an agency appropriately may bend in the direction of the changing winds that
elected its administration. 14 0 The majority in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,Inc.14 1 suggested a similar approach when the Court
is reviewing an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.1 42 But whatever
136. See Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement ofRights in the
FederalCourts, 38 HASTnNGs L.J. 665, 717 (1987) ("Congress cannot anticipate all of the situations
in which a law may apply, and thus it cannot always specify in advance the precise remedy that
justice requires.").
137. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading ofStatutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529
(1947) ("The intrinsic difficulties of language and the emergence after enactment of situations not
anticipated by the most gifted legislative imagination, reveal doubts and ambiguities in statutes that
compel judicial construction.").
138. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1524 (1987)
("Political theory and experience suggest that because of the many procedural obstacles to legislation
in our bicameral committee-dominated Congress, the tendency of interest groups to block rather
than advance legislation, and the deference that legislators and their staffs will typically give to
virtually any decision of the Supreme Court, such legislative correction will rarely occur.")
A recent example of this was the lengthy Congressional struggle to overturn the Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-74 (1984), which held that the anti-discrimination laws applied narrowly to programs or activities that received federal funds, rather than to the
institutions in which such programs or activities were located. Bills to restore the more expansive
scope of the law, believed by most involved with the legislation to have reflected Congress' intent,
were introduced into every session following the Court's decision. However, despite widespread
support, none of these bills succeeded in passing both houses of Congress. Cohodas, Senate Passes
Civil Rights Bill That Rolls Back Abortion Rules, CONG. QUART. WEEKLY REP., Jan. 30, 1988, at
213-14. In March 1988 Congress finally passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, also
known as the "Grove City bill," S. 557. President Reagan subsequently vetoed the bill. On March
22, both the House and Senate overrode his veto, and Pub. L. No. 100-259 became law. Willen,
Congress OverridesReagan's Grove City Veto, CONG. QUART. WEEKLY REP., Mar. 26, 1988, at 77476.
139. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
140. Id2 at 59.
141. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
142. Chevron presented judicial review of the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation
of the ambiguous undefined term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42
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the appropriateness of judicial deference to an executive agency's interpretation
of its own organic statute in light of changing political realities, such considerations are irrelevant to the issue of whether courts can award attorneys' fees for
cases resolved administratively. It is not within the Court's province to con-

clude that the goals of the 1964 Act should yield to the current administration's

agenda or current economic realities. 143 For the Court to implement what it

perceives to be the Administration's agenda, especially in the face of contemporaneous congressional expressions to the contrary, 144 would threaten our con-

stitutional balance of separation of powers. 145 If it is impossible to divine
Congress' specific intent regarding fees for cases resolved administratively, because Congress had no such intent capable of divination, as appears to be the
case here, the Court's role is to identify the goals of the statute and reach a result

most consistent with those goals. 14 6 This it has not done. The inquiry the Court
should have made in Crest was whether granting attorneys' fees to parties who

prevail at the administrative level in Title VI actions was what Congress would
have done had it thought about it.147
B. How the Court Should Interpret Section 1988 and Section 706(k)
Given the principles of statutory construction discussed above, how then

should the Court review these particular congressional enactments-the attorney's fee provisions of sections 1988 and 706(k)? On one hand, one might argue

that given the presumption laid down by the Court in Alyeska that each party to
litigation bears its own attorney's fees unless Congress specifically states otherU.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982). The Court held that when a term is ambiguous, a reviewing court should
defer to the rational interpretation of the agency, even if such interpretation has changed from administration to administration. Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843-44, 865.
143. See A. BARAK, JUDIcIAL DISCRETIoN 266 (forthcoming February 1989, Yale University
Press) ("[Where the law is unclear, ambiguqus, or open-textured, the judge should interpret it according to fundamental principles, not according to the fleeting moods of society; according to the
articles of faith of the nation... not according to the ever-changing balance of political forces.").
144. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
145. See Eskridge, supra note 138. While Eskridge advocates a doctrine of dynamic statutory
interpretation, so that courts should interpret statutes "in light of their present societal, political, and
legal context," id at 1479, he affirmatively rejects any notion that such context should be dictated by
the Executive branch. In fact, he criticizes the degree to which courts defer to agency lawmaking:
[Blureaucrats, like judges, are not elected. To give them power to update statutes seems no
more legitimate than to recognize a similar power in judges. If anything, judges who update statutes are more trustworthy. They are not only removed from the political process
but are also in positions that give them few incentives to slant their interpretations, as
bureaucrats often do, in favor of regulated groups.
Id at 1534. Unfortunately, the Court's result in Crest is evidence of the danger of giving courts as
much latitude in lawmaking as Eskridge would give them.
146. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
That Congress did not specifically consider the issue of fee waivers tells us absolutely
nothing about whether such waivers ought to be permitted. It is black-letter law that "[i]n
the absence of specific evidence of Congressional intent, it becomes necessary to resort to a
broader consideration of the legislative policy behind th[e] provision .... "
Id. at 744 (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945)).
147. See Zeigler, supra note 136, at 717 ("when faced with congressional silence, a court should
not ask simply whether Corigress intended to create a private right of action on behalf of a particular
plaintiff... it should also ask whether Congress, if it had considered this situation, would have
wanted the plaintiff to have a private right of action").
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wise, Congress' failure to state explicitly that fees should be available to litigants
who succeed before filing suit justifies the Court's result in Crest. However,
competing with the American rule's presumption against fee-shifting is the congressional mandate that remedies be liberally available to accomplish the goals
1 48
of federal civil rights legislation.
But are they really in competition? Both doctrines were designed to make
litigation more accessible to plaintiffs. The justification for the American attorneys' fee rule is principally that plaintiffs might be discouraged from vindicating
rights by the risk that losing would subject them to liability for their opponents'
attorneys' fees. 149 Congress passed the civil rights fee-shifting statutes in order

to provide an affirmative inducement to parties whose rights have been infringed
by providing an effective means of seeking redress. While this does not answer
the question whether the Court should hold that sections 1988 and 706(k) provide for fee-shifting in cases resolved administratively, it presents an important
point of departure.
One must meet the argument that defendants who have contracted with the
federal government by accepting federal financial assistance have agreed to abide
by various obligation statutes such as Title VI, and that such agreement warrants judicial reluctance to clarify any ambiguities in favor of broadening the
application of the fee-shifting statutes. If section 1988 is interpreted to apply to
Title VI administrative proceedings, recipients of federal funds will face potentially greaternet liability. Had they been aware of the potential for such liability,
the argument goes, they might not have agreed to contract with the government.15 0 The Court has expressed hesitation in recent cases to impose such liability in the absence of explicit expression of congressional intent to do so.151
The Court's hesitation in such cases is misplaced. Congress' expressed desire to
ensure redress for violations of the nondiscrimination statutes should outweigh
any concern of unfairness to those who have violated the terms of their contracts
by discriminating. Furthermore, extending section 1988 to Title VI cases resolved administratively is a small step compared to what the Court did when it
held that the nondiscrimination statutes created a private right to sue and collect
damages from recipients of federal funds.1 52 Expanding the application of the
148. "In the civil rights area, Congress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most
effective remedies available to achieve the goals of our civil rights laws." S. REP. No. 1011, supra
note 36, at 3. Congress explicitly considered attorneys' fees to be such a remedy. Id.

149. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1966).
150. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 596 (1983) (opinion of White, J.)
("[T]he receipt of federal funds under typical Spending Clause legislation [such as Title VI] is a
consensual matter: the State or other grantee weighs the benefits and burdens before accepting the
funds and agreeing to comply with the conditions attached to their receipt."). This argument was
made by the Justice Department in its amicus brief in Crest in support of its position that Crest was
not entitled to fees for work done at the administrative proceedings. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Crest, 479 U.S. 6 (1986).

151. See, eg., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012, 1020-21 (1984) (no attorneys' fees under

§ 1988 for § 1983 claim based on violation of EHA rights); GuardiansAss'n, 463 U.S. at 598 (no

action for damages where basis for claim is nonintentional discrimination); cf Pennhurst State

School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (no federal court jurisdiction to enjoin state
institutions and state officials in absence of waiver of state's immunity).
152. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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fee-shifting statutes to cases resolved at a stage earlier than judicial litigation
creates a far smaller potential liability than establishing a private cause of action
in the first place.
1. The Words Themselves
Two ambiguous aspects of section 1988 are muddled by the Crest majority:
(1) whether one who has prevailed in a civil rights claim enumerated under section 1988 may sue solely to recover fees for the proceeding in which he has
prevailed, and (2) "whether negotiations subsequent to the filing of a Title VI
administrative complaint are, under § 1988, 'proceedings to enforce' Title
VI."153 The Court held in Crest that because it decided that section 1988 provides no independent action for fees in a case resolved before filing, it did not
need to reach the question of whether the Department of Transportation's Title
VI administrative proceedings were "proceedings to enforce" the civil rights
statutes enumerated in section 1988.154 But the Court resolved the former question by reference to the legislative history's use of the terms "judicial processes"
and "courts" to describe the "actions or proceedings" contemplated by section
1988.155 Since no one seems to dispute that one must file a judicial action 15 6 to
assert one's legal right to recover attorneys' fees, 15 7 the Crest majority's decision
not to decide the latter because it resolves the case based on the former makes
little sense. The Court's reasoning that Congress intended attorneys' fee awards
to be available only for cases in which a judicial action is filed 15 8 has obvious
implications for whether the Department of Transportation's administrative
proceedings in Crest were the kinds of proceedings contemplated by section
1988. Thus the Crest decision sheds darkness where the Carey decision seemed
to shed some light on divining Congress' intent as to whether Title VI administrative proceedings come within the ambit of section 1988.
What about the Crest Court's construction of the "plain meaning" of the
language in section 1988, "action or proceedings to enforce"? Does it mean that
the fees must be sought within the same "action or proceedings to enforce," or,
alternatively, that a court may award fees in a separate action for attorneys'
153. Crest, 479 U.S. at 12.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. This may be contrasted with those cases in which the defendant/respondent is a federal
administrative agency. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c)(5)(d) (discriminating agency or EEOC may
award attorneys' fees to prevailing party); Smith v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 530, 534 (D.D.C. 1978)
(agency has authority to award attorneys' fees to prevailing complainants); see also H. NEWBERG,
ATIORNEY FEE AWARDS 269 n.46 (1986).

Courts were initially split over whether administrative agencies or the courts alone were
authorized to make fee awards. The EEOC, successor to the Civil Service Commission's
responsibility for employment discrimination monitoring in the federal government, responded to the conflict by promulgating regulations authorizing the discriminating agency
to pay attorney's fees. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c).

Id.
157. Carey, 447 U.S. at 66; Crest, 769 F.2d at 1033.
158. Crest, 479 U.S. at 14 ("The legislative history clearly envisions that attorney's fees would be
awarded for proceedings only when those proceedings are part of or followed by a lawsuit.").
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services rendered in the course of such enforcement action or proceedings? Notice how a simple rephrasing of the virtually identical language in section 706(k)
in Parkerv. Califano 159 affects the meaning:
Specifically, Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970), provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subehapter the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs ....
The effect of Section 717(d) [pertaining to federal employees] coupled
with Section 706(k) is, therefore, to allow a federal court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorneys' fees to a federal employee or applicant who is the prevailing party in "any action or proceeding" under
Title VII.16°
In other words, under this rephrasing, a court which had jurisdiction to
hear the claim-and section 1331 general federal question jurisdiction would
provide such jurisdiction to a federal district court161-could award, under a
cause of action created by section 706(k) or section 1988, attorneys' fees to a
party who had prevailed in a proceeding to enforce one of the civil rights laws
enumerated in the fee-shifting provisions, whether that proceeding was administrative or judicial. Nothing in the majority's brief analysis in Crest persuades
that its interpretation of the "plain language" of section 1988 is any more compelling than the above.
But did Congress mean "administrative" proceedings when it used the
word "proceedings" in section 1988? The Crest majority's reading of the legislative history suggests that it did not. One cannot, however, make a principled
argument that "proceedings" meant administrative proceedings in section
706(k), as Carey held, but not in section 1988. Carey demonstrates that Congress
anticipated administrative proceedings by noting that the word "proceedings" is
absent from Title II's comparable attorneys' fee provision, section 204(b), be16 2
cause Title II, unlike Title VI, relied exclusively on judicial enforcement.
When Congress patterned section 1988 on section 706(k), rather than on section
204(b), we can only assume, without evidence to the contrary, that it did so
purposefully. 163 Even though the legislative history makes repeated references
to "suits" and "courts" and "judicial process," and fails to refer explicitly to
administrative processes, the absence of the latter should not be deemed adequate evidence that the word "proceedings" in section 1988 was "mere
159. 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (upholding discretion of district court to award attorneys'
fees to federal prevailing party for work done prefiling at administrative level).
160. Id at 323.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the.., laws.., of the United States.").
162. Carey, 447 U.S. at 61; accordParker,561 F.2d at 327-28.

163. In fact, Senator Helms introduced a printed amendment on the Senate floor to amend the
bill which became § 1988 by deleting the words "or proceeding." It was defeated by a wide margin
in a recorded vote. 122 CONG. REc. 32933 (1976) (Remarks of Sen. Helms).
Nor can "proceeding" in § 1988 mean only mandatory administrative proceedings, because
none of the enumerated civil rights laws in § 1988 have mandatory administrative proceedings. See
infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
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surplusage."164

2. The Purpose of the Fee-shifting Statutes
Compounding the weakness of the Crest majority's reading of the statutory
language of section 1988 is its failure to reconcile its holding with Congress'
express purpose to encourage effective access to counsel in order to ensure a
meaningful remedy for violations of the civil rights statutes enumerated in section 1988. Inasmuch as the fee-shifting provision is a tool to accomplish the
nondiscrimination goals of Title VI, it makes little sense to allow fees for Title
VI administrative proceedings occurring before the filing of a lawsuit, while disallowing fees for administrative proceedings which avoid the necessity of a lawsuit. A lawyer cannot possibly know at the point at which she agrees to take on
a case whether she will be able to resolve a complaint short of a lawsuit. Since
Congress provided for fee-shifting in order to encourage attorneys to provide
representation in civil rights cases, then it likely wanted to offer an incentive
which would affect the attorney's decision at the stage at which she decides
whether or not to undertake representation.
If, as the Court suggested in Crest, Congress only wanted to shift fees
should it be necessary to go to court, it makes no sense to award attorneys' fees
for processes that occurred before that became necessary. Otherwise, compensation for administrative processes would be a windfall to the attorney who subsequently decided to file a lawsuit. However, while not providing fees for any
work done at the administrative level might be a principled approach, it would
frustrate Congress' plan that both formal and informal processes be utilized for
resolution of civil rights complaints. In addition, it is inconsistent with the
Court's reasoning and holding in Carey, as well as dicta in Webb and Crest that
stated that fees could be recovered for work done at the administrative level
165
necessary to the litigation.
3. Congress' Understanding of the Carey Decision
Congress' response to the Court's decision in Carey provides an additional
basis for criticizing the Court's decision in Crest. While the doctrine of legislative acquiescence in judicial construction of congressional enactments generally
164. Carey, 447 U.S. at 61; see Crest, 769 F.2d at 1030-31. But see Webb, 471 U.S. at 241 n.16
("the dominant characteristic of civil rights actions is that 'they belong in court' "); Arriola v.
Harville, 781 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding nonadversarial preclearance process not proceedings within meaning of fee-shifting provision of Voting Rights Act).
165. Carey itself is an excellent example of the absurdity of the Crest majority's approach. In
Carey, plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit only after she had prevailed at the state and federal administrative levels, while the case was on appeal in state court. Had she waited for the termination of state
proceedings, it is extremely unlikely any federal suit would have been necessary (other than to recover attorneys' fees). Under the Court's Crest approach, she was entitled to fees for all work performed at the state and federal administrative level because she filed the federal suit; had her timing
been otherwise, she would not have been. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text for expanded discussion of case history. But see Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding district court could award attorneys' fees for Title VII case resolved administratively
even without previously filed federal suit on the merits).
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supports only a weak inference of congressional intent, 166 the issue of attorneys'
167
fees for cases resolved administratively presents "an unusually strong case"
for considering what has transpired in Congress since the Court's 1980 Carey
decision.
In Carey a six-member majority of the Court stated unambiguously that
attorneys' fees should be awarded under section 706(k) in a judicial action filed
solely to recover fees for the successful resolution in separate proceedings of a
Title VII complaint. 168 In 1982 the majority of the Court still understood this
to be the meaning of Carey.169 But if a majority of the 1986 Supreme Court
believed the 1980 majority in Carey was simply wrong in its analysis, why
should it compound its error by deciding Crest erroneously as well? The answer
lies in Congress' response to Carey. First, if the Court were wrong when it decided Carey in 1980, Congress could have overturned the Court's decision. Not
a single bill was ever introduced in Congress to do so. 170 The Carey Court,
focusing to a degree Congress was never forced to on the question whether administrative proceedings should be covered under section 706(k), appropriately
upheld the availability of attorneys' fees for such proceedings. Congress acquiesced in this expansion, not merely by never considering whether to enact legislation to overrule Carey, but also by using Carey in subsequent deliberations to
support fee-shifting in other contexts.
Congress acted with uncharacteristic swiftness in responding to the Court's
1984 decision in Smith v. Robinson 17 1 interpreting the lack of an attorneys' fee
provision in the Education of the Handicapped Act to preclude a section 1988
fee award for a section 1983 action brought to enforce the Act's requirements. 17 2
Both the wording of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986173
overruling Smith v. Robinson and the Act's legislative history support the conclusion that Congress affirmatively approved of the Carey decision. Section 2 of
174
the Act explicitly provides for attorneys' fees for administrative proceedings.
The committee report accompanying the Senate bill stated that section 2 should
be interpreted consistently with the fee provisions of Title VII, "which authorizes courts to award fees for time spent by counsel in mandatory administrative
proceedings," 17 5 citing Carey as support. Senator Simon, in floor debate on the
166. See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 205 (1983) (urging cautious use of post-enactment legislative history
for interpreting statutory meaning).
167. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) ("Congress' awareness of tI'e
denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence.").
168. Carey, 447 U.S. at 61, 66.
169. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451-52 n.13 (1982).
170. The only bill to amend either § 706(k) or § 1988 introduced after the Carey decision was
H.R_ 2170 (April 23, 1985), the import of which was to ensure immunity to members of the judiciary
under § 1988. This bill was never referred out of the Judiciary Committee.
171. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
172. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1021; see supra note 133.
173. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1985).
174. Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2, 100 Stat. 796 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B)).
175. S.REP. No. 112, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1804.
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bill, 176 stated that the language in S. 415 was purposefully identical to that in
Title VII, and specifically referred to the Court's statement in Carey that one
may sue solely to obtain an award of attorneys' fees for work done in state and
local proceedings. This interpretation of Section 2 was made explicit in the
House Report:
[I]f a parent prevails on the merits at an administrative proceeding...
the parent may be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in such administrative proceeding. Usually, the
amount of such fees, costs, and expenses will be agreed to by the public
agency. If no agreement is possible, the parent may file a law suit for
the limited purpose of receiving an award of reasonable fees, costs, and
expenses. 177
Thus the legislative history shows that in 1985 Congress believed Carey
held that Title VII authorized such suits for Title VII complainants who prevailed at the administrative level, and intended a similar authorization for fees
for suits arising under the Education for Handicapped Children's Act. Despite
the Crest Court's characterization as dictum its language in Carey that Title VII
authorizes a suit solely to recover attorneys' fees, members of Congress approved that very language of the Court as a correct statement of the law in the
178
months preceding the Crest decision.
The foregoing provides additional support for concluding that the Court
erred in Crest in not following the reasoning or result in Carey. "'[T]he relevant
inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but
rather what its perception of the state of the law was.' "179 The correctness of
the conclusion that section 1988 authorizes a suit solely to recover fees for a
federal administrative resolution of a Title VI complaint is further bolstered by
Congress' expressed policy of uniformity among its fee statutes.
4.

Consistency

A desire for consistency emerges.as a theme throughout the legislative history of the federal civil rights fee-shifting statutes. The legislative history of
section 1988 declares its purpose to be to "give the federal courts discretion to
award attorneys' fees.., to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws...
and to achieve consistency .... ,180 Representative Drinan argued in the House
that "by permitting fees to be recovered under those statutes, we seek to make
176. 131 CONG. RiEc. 21,392 (1985).
177. H.R. REP. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985); see Schreck, Attorneys'FeesForAdministrative ProceedingsUnder the Education of the HandicappedAct: Of Carey, Crest Street and CongressionalIntent, 60 TEMPLE L. Q. 599, 639-50 (1987) (exploration of statutory history establishes
Congress' intent that the 1986 amendments to the EHCA provided for suits solely to recover attorneys' fees to prevailing parties). Schreck points out that some controversy nonetheless exists as to
whether the EHCA amendments were intended to apply to parties who prevailed at the administra-

tive level. See id. at 601.
178. See Schreck, supra note 177, at 654-55.
179. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 658 (1982) (quoting Brown v.
General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976)); Wald, supra note 166, at 211.
180. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 1.
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uniform the rule that a prevailing party, in a civil rights case, may, in the discretion of the court, recover counsel fees." 18 1 Congress' desire for uniformity
among the fee-shifting statutes motivated the Fourth Circuit in Crest to adopt
the same construction of identical language and interpret "proceedings" in section 1988 consistently with the Carey Court's interpretation of that word in sec1
tion 706(k).

82

Congress' desire for consistent interpretation of sections 1988 and 706(k)
has been recognized frequently by courts that have based their holdings interpreting one of these statutes on cases interpreting the other statute.183 The Court
in Crest did not argue for inconsistent interpretation of the two statutes; rather,
it apparently concluded that Congress had not provided under either statute for
attorneys' fees to prevailing parties whose cases were resolved administratively
before a federal lawsuit had been filed. 184 But such a result is not consistent
with current Title VII practice and procedure. Courts, commentators and the
EEOC have regularly interpreted Carey to allow for an award of attorneys' fees
for cases resolved administratively. 185 Such a provision is made explicit in
EEOC regulations regarding compensation for attorneys' fees 186 for charges
made by federal employees under section 717(d) of the Act.18 7 The EEOC regulations provide that the Commission or the respondent agency may pay the
charging employee "reasonable attorney's fees or costs incurred in the process181. 122 CONG. REc. 35,122 (1976); see also id. at 35,126 (remarks of Rep. Fish regarding filling
in the "gap in the civil rights laws").
182. Crest, 769 F.2d at 1029.
183.. See Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1982) (§ 1988 attorneys' fee
granted for prisoners' due process claim based upon analogy to § 706(k) cases); Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor, 663 F.2d 443, 447 n.5; 449 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981) (§ 706(k) attorneys' fee
allowed for successful union arbitration of sex discrimination claim based upon comparison to
§ 1988 cases).
184. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this conclusion recently in Jones v.
American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1988). Based on Carey, the Jones court concluded that
a party who prevailed in administrative proceedings pursuant to Title VII could bring a federal suit
solely to recover attorneys' fees. The court distinquished § 1988 in a brief footnote based on the
absence of a mandatory exhaustion provision in that statute and supported its conclusion with reference to Crest. Id. at 498 n.9. While I applaud the court's reading of Congress' purpose in enacting
Title VII and its attorneys' fees provision, for reasons I suggest here and will discuss infra at text
accompanying notes 247-63 1submit the court was wrong in both its reading of Crest and its analysis
of the relevance of the mandatory/optional distinction between Title VII and other civil rights
statutes.
185. See Jones, 857 F.2d at 496; Mertz v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 1578, 1580-81 (11th Cir. 1986) (no
fees for work resolved before filing of administrative complaint); Skinner v. E.E.O.C., 551 F. Supp.
333, 337 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (Carey makes clear "that, in a case where a party prevails on a discrimination claim at the administrative level and does not file a suit in federal court other than for the
award of fees, that party is nevertheless entitled to fees under Title VII"); see, e.g., Porter v. District
of Columbia, 502 F. Supp. 271, 273 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd and remandedon other grounds, 673 F.2d
552 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also H. NEWBERG, ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS 268 ("In New York Gaslight
Club v. Carey, the Supreme Court held that Title VII may encompass a suit solely to obtain an
award for legal work done in state and local proceedings pursuant to exhaustion of local and administrative remedies prior to requesting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to take action."); EEOC Policy Statement, April 2, 1986 (For cases otherwise precluded under Court's
decision in Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), EEOC will issue right to sue
notices to prevailing complainants seeking attorneys' fees only.).
186. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c) (1988).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1982) (incorporating the fee provisions of § 706(k)); see Mertz,
786 F.2d at 1580.
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ing of the complaint or charge." 188
Given Congress' desire for consistency, it is useful to examine the variety of

fee-shifting statutes it has promulgated in recent years that provide for attorneys' fees for work done at the administrative level. The Equal Access to Justice

Act 189 provides for attorneys' fees to parties who prevail in disputes with other
federal agencies. Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act on finding

that prohibitive costs and massive disparities in economic resources and expertise had deterred private parties from seeking to vindicate their rights in disputes
with governmental agencies.' 90 Its provisions apply to agency "adversary adjudications," 19 1 although recovery is limited largely to hearings required by section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 192 The agency itself determines
the appropriate fee award, 193 but the Act provides for judicial review if the pre194
vailing party is dissatisfied with such fee determination.

Other statutes refer to administrative proceedings obliquely, creating a
good deal of confusion and inconsistency in how the courts have interpreted the

fees-for-administrative-proceedings question, not unlike the confusion manifested in the Carey/Webb/Crestline of Supreme Court opinions. Some of these

statutes contain language similar to the "action or proceedings" language of section 1988 and section 706(k), while others make no reference to "proceedings."

One fee-shifting statute in the latter category is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 195 The courts that have considered the question have split on
196
whether fees may be allowed for work performed at the administrative level.
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(d) (1988). "Attorney's fees shall be paid only for services performed
after the filing of the complaint required in § 1613.214 and after the complainant has notified the
agency that he or she is represented by an attorney, except that fees are allowable for a reasonable
period of time prior to the notification of representation for any services performed in reaching a
determination to represent the complainant." Id. § 1613.271(d)(iv).
189. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982).
190. H.R. REP.No. 1418, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4984.
191. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (1982).
192. Id. § 504(b)(1)(C). Congress justified the limitations of the act, which included adjudications to fix rates or to grant or renew licenses, as "basic fairness" to the government, an attempt to
keep costs down, and a desire to limit fees to situations where "concrete issues are at stake." H.R.
REP. No. 1418, supra note 190, at 12, 14. Accordingly, recovery was limited, almost completely, to
adjudications contemplated in § 554, which includes "every case of adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). The
Act contains other important limitations such as that no recovery will be awarded if the agency's
position in the adjudication was "substantially justified." Id. § 504(a)(1).
193. Id. § 504(a).
194. Id. § 504(c)(2).
195. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 626(b) (1982). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act incorporates
by reference the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216. The FLSA
provides for "the court in such action" to allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the plaintiff.
Id. § 216(b) (emphasis added).
196. Compare D'Angelo v. Department of the Navy, 593 F. Supp. 1307, 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Koyen v. Consolidated Edison, 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Swain v. Secretary of the
Navy, 27 Fair Empl. Proe. Cas. (BNA) 1434, 1435 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 509 F. Supp. 226, 232 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff'd, 690 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recovery not allowed) with Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati
& Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1987) and Blealdey v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F.
Supp 236 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (recovery allowed).
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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Kennedy v.
Whitehurst 197 held that attorneys' fees are not awardable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act for services performed at the administrative
level when the underlying claim was settled without resort to district court litigation. 198 Plaintiffs, federal employees, had obtained a "no-fault" settlement of
retroactive promotion before the EEOC and subsequently sued for attorneys'
fees. 199 The court concluded that "the same factors which led to the conclusion
that Title VII authorizes an award of fees for attorney's services at the administrative level counsels the opposite conclusion as to the ADEA. '' 2°° First, it
looked to the language of the Act, which did not contain any reference to "proceedings." 20 1 Second, it distinguished section 706(k) and the Court's decision in
Carey providing for a suit for fees for administrative work by concluding that
unlike Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act required no exhaustion of administrative remedies. 20 2 While the Act does have a prelitigation
filing requirement, the court held that it was not the equivalent of Title VI's
requirement that a plaintiff pursue administrative proceedings before filing suit
in federal court.20 3 Thus the court relied on the language of the statute and the
mandatory/optional distinction rather than on the fact that plaintiff brought the
2 °4
litigation solely to recover attorneys' fees.
The Second Circuit rejected the Kennedy court's analysis in Reichman v.
Bonsignore, Brignati& Mazzotta P. C.205 In Reichman, plaintiff prevailed on her
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in federal court, and
sought attorneys' fees. Her employer contested fees for the time plaintiff's counsel spent in presenting her claim to state and federal administrative agencies,
claiming that time was not compensable under the Act, based on the
mandatory/optional distinction articulated in Kennedy. The court, however, rejected the distinction drawn by Kennedy between the filing requirements under
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
By requiring resort, where available, to administrative remedies for age
197. 509 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
198. Id. at 228, 231.
199. Id. at 227.
200. Id. at 230.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 230-31.
203. In relevant part, the Act provides: "No civil action may be commenced by an individual
under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).

204. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court, but not necessarily for the same reasons. Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although
Kennedy was a federal employee, the district court gave that no bearing in its analysis. Kennedy v.
Whitehurst, 590 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The circuit
court, however, opined that there was evidence, including a recent Supreme Court case, Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981) (holding federal employees, unlike private plaintiffs, had no right to
jury trial under ADEA), that the same procedural rights afforded to private individuals under the
ADEA did not necessarily obtain to federal employees, so that it was not clear that attorneys' fees
were available at all to prevailing federal plaintiffs under the ADEA. Kennedy, 690 F.2d at 956. The
circuit court did agree however that the administrative scheme under the ADEA did not equal the
importance of the administrative scheme under Title VII. Id. at 963-64.
205. 818 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1987).
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discrimination prior to bringing a suit under the ADEA, Congress intended to give state agencies a significant role in combatting discrimination in the
workplace, similar to the role given state agencies under
20 6

Title VII.

Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's award of fees for attorneys' services before the state and federal administrative agencies. 20 7 Inasmuch
as the issue was not before it, however, the court reserved decision on whether a
fee award would be appropriate when the age discrimination claim is completely
resolved at the administrative level. 208 The court failed to address the relevance9
20
of the absence of the word "proceedings" in the Act's fee-shifting provision.
In 1986, in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clear
Air,210 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the absence of reference to
"proceedings" in a statute is not determinative as to whether a prevailing party
in litigation may recover for work done at the federal administrative level. Section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act provides: "The court, in issuing any final order
in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs
of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. '2 11 Plaintiffs claimed
attorneys' fees from the defendant for hours spent in proceedings before the Environmental Protection Agency to enforce a previously litigated consent decree.
The district court had found the work done at the administrative level sufficiently related to the litigation to be compensable. 212 The court of appeals
agreed that plaintiffs' rights under the consent decree would have been impaired
but for such administrative proceedings, relying on the "useful and ordinary"
language in Webb. 2 13 The Supreme Court agreed, finding that "the work done
by counsel in these two phases was as necessary to the attainment of adequate
relief for their client as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom which
'214
secured Delaware Valley's initial success in obtaining the consent decree."
The statute's failure to refer to administrative proceedings was not determinative. Defense counsel argued that when Congress meant for administrative proceedings to be covered in a fee-shifting statute, it knew how to so provide, as
206. Id at 282-83.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 283. The court refers explicitly to Justice Stevens' concurrence in Carey. Id.
209. See also BIealdey v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp 236 (S.D. Ga. 1982). Unlike the Second Circuit, the Bleakley court did address the language difference between § 706(k) and
§ 216, but found that it was not critical to the Supreme Court's holding in Carey. The Bleakley
court found the emphasis placed by the Kennedy court on the mandatory/voluntary distinction misplaced. "The more important focus [in Carey] was the federal-state enforcement scheme contemplated by Title VII." Ia at 243. Furthermore, it held that Kennedy was wrong in stating that state
administrative proceedings were not important under the ADEA, citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979), in which the Court required an "aggrieved person to resort to appropriate state remedies before instituting a federal ADEA action." Id. at 244.
210. 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982).
212. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1423,
1429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
213. 762 F.2d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
214. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 558.
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evidenced by the language of sections 1988 and 706(k). The Court disagreed.
The fact that section 1988 refers to a "proceeding" as well as an action, said the

Court, is not sufficient to prove that Congress did not mean administrative proceedings should be covered under the Clean Air Act as well, noting that the
legislative history for the Act used the two words interchangeably. 215 More importantly, said the Court, the purposes behind both sections 304 and 1988 "are
nearly identical, which lends credence to the idea that they should be interpreted
in a similar manner.

'2 16

Thus, relying on its earlier interpretation of sections

706(k) and 1988 in Carey and Webb, and given the common purpose of sections
304 and 1988 "to promote citizen enforcement of important federal policies,"
the Court concluded no reason existed to interpret the two provisions
2 17

differently.
Parties who prevailed on their claims at administrative proceedings under
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act have litigated whether the relatively new attorneys'-fee provision of the Handicapped Children's Protection
Act 2 18 applies to them, and the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the question have held that it does. 2 19 The one reported dissenting case,
Rollison v. Biggs,2 20 relies on Crest in reaching the conclusion that fees are not
available for cases resolved before the filing of litigation. It rejects the indications in the legislative history that.fees were to be available under the Handicapped Children's Protection Act for cases resolved administratively, 22 1 and
focuses instead on Congress' desire that the Act be interpreted consistently with
other fee-shifting statutes. Despite the powerful evidence in the legislative history 222 and the fact that the Court decided Crest several months after the passage of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, 22 3 the Rollison court
bootstraps Congress' desire for consistency and the Crest Court's narrow interpretation of section 1988 into a rationale for frustrating Congress' expressed in215. Id. at 559 ("the lack of the phrase 'or proceedings' on the face of§ 304(d) is not necessarily
indicative of the intended scope of the section"); see S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37
(1970).
216. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 559.
217. Id. at 560. The Court reserved judgment on "whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate in federal administrative proceedings when there is no connected court action in which fees
are recoverable," the issue it subsequently resolved in Crest. Id. at 560 n.5.
218. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986).
219. See, eg., Eggers v. Bullitt County School Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 895-98 (6th Cir. 1988);
Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 741 n.9 (2d Cir. 1988); Turton v. Crisp County School Dist., 688 F.
Supp. 1535, 1539 (M.D. Ga. 1988); Robert D. v. Sobel, 688 F. Supp. 861, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Chang v. Board of Educ., 685 F. Supp. 96, 100 (D.N.J. 1988); Neisz v. Portland Public School Dist.,
684 F. Supp. g 1530, 1533 (D. Ore. 1988); Unified School Dist. No. 259 v. Newton, 673 F. Supp.
418, 422 (D. Kans. 1987); School Board of Prince William County v. Malone, 662 F. Supp. 999,
1001 (E.D.Va. 1987); Burpee v. Manchester School Dist., 661 F. Supp. 731, 732 (D.N.H. 1987) (all
holding or confirming that in EAHCA cases, counsel fees may be recovered in federal court for work
done at the administrative level where underlying merits never reach the court). But see Rollison v.
Biggs, 660 F. Supp. 875, 877 (D. Del. 1987); Mitten v. Muscogee County School Dist., Civ. Action
No. 87-76-COL (M.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1988) (concluding that fees are not available for EAHCA cases
resolved at the administrative level).
220. 660 F. Supp. 875 (D. Del. 1987).
221. Id. at 877.
222. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
223. See Schreck, supra note 177, at 654.
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tent to specifically provide for "the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to
'22 4
prevailing parents in ERA civil actions and in administrative proceedings.
The weakness of the court's analysis in promoting Congress' desire for consistency, at the expense of ignoring Congress' intent to provide for attorneys' fees
in cases resolved at the administrative level in the Handicapped Children's Pro225
tection Act, underscores the error of the Court's holding in Crest.
The various cases attempting to construe the applicability of various feeshifting provisions to a range of administrative processes show how Congress'
desire for consistency has been frustrated and misused. The Supreme Court has
failed to address the issue of fees for administrative proceedings in a consistently
principled way, and the lower courts have inevitably followed its confusing lead.
There is, nonetheless, a principled approach to be divined in interpreting
sections 706(k) and 1988's applicability to attorneys' fees for cases resolved
administratively.
5.

Which Proceedings? Distinguishing Crest and Webb
Administrative Proceedings

Several dichotomies appear throughout the fee-shifting cases. One is the
distinction between cases resolved before and after filing of litigation that the
Court found determinative in Crest. Another is the distinction between statutory schemes which contain requirements that complainants first pursue administrative remedies and those that do not, which I refer to as the mandatory/
optional dichotomy. Still another is the distinction between state and federal
processes. The courts have consistently failed to make sense of the relevance of
these dichotomies in deciding whether attorneys' fees are authorized for cases
resolved administratively.
This Article has questioned earlier, and will further explore below, the
Crest decision's logic in hinging the question of the availability of fees under
sections 706(k) and 1988 on whether the prevailing party filed a lawsuit before it
resolved its case before the agency, or whether it resolved its case, and then fied
a suit to recover fees. 226 This Article will also challenge the logic of hinging fee
awards on whether administrative proceedings are compulsory or merely encouraged. 227 This section will examine the category of "encouraged" procedures, and will explain why recovery of fees for such procedures-like those
created by Title VI-should be distinguished from the kinds of state and local
administrative procedures for which fees were denied in Webb. Fees should not
necessarily be available for all optional federal administrative proceedings, nor
should they necessarily be unavailable for optional state proceedings; rather, the
court should look to how the proceeding and the service performed by the attorney fit into the enforcement scheme for vindication of the particular civil right
224. S. REP. No. 112, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (section-by-section analysis).
225. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 151 and accompanying text, infra notes 264-91 and accompanying text.

227. See infra notes 247-63 and accompanying text.
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for which fees are sought. 228

Unlike the state and local proceedings for which fees were denied in

Webb, 229 Title VI and Title VII administrative proceedings are integral compo-

nents of Congress' plan for the enforcement of those statutes. The Carey Court
clearly understood this, 230 as did the Fourth Circuit in Crest.23 1 Congress' ex-

press desire that Title VII and Title VI rights be vindicated through federal
administrative as well as judicial channels distinguishes such 232
procedures from
the optional state administrative procedures at issue in Webb.
In addition, for reasons of comity, the federal and state procedures should
be distinguished. Congress should tread carefully in providing federal remedies
to state created rights; policies of federalism dictate that federal courts should
not casually intrude into state processes. The mandatory state administrative
proceedings at issue in Carey are easily distinguished, since they form an integral

part of the federal Title VII enforcement scheme. 233 Only through the consent
of the several states does the EEOC delegate primary enforcement of Title VII
234
rights to state agencies.

Recovery of fees for state proceedings under section 1988 for services rendered at the state level, when fees are not provided for by state law, should be

allowed only when doing so furthers an important federal goal. In Bartholomew
v. Watson, 235 a section 1983 action brought by inmates in an Oregon prison

challenging certain prison practices and procedures, the district court abstained
pending the state court's interpretation of Oregon law's application to certain

new procedures. The parties stipulated that the Oregon judgment would not be
228. See Crest, 769 F.2d at 1029 ("Some of the substantive provisions listed in § 1988 explicitly
contemplate civil actions in state or federal court, and some, such as Title VI, explicitly contemplate
initial administrative proceedings with possible later judicial review.").
229. 471 U.S. at 241.
230. Carey, 447 U.S. at 64-65.
231. Crest, 769 F.2d at 1033. That court discerned a logic to the Supreme Court attorneys' fee
cases preceding their decision that supported its conclusion which § 1988 provides for fees for Title
VI cases resolved administratively:
In all three of the most pertinent Supreme Court cases-Carey,Smith, and Webb-the
Court applied the attorney's fees statutes as written but examined the congressional enforcement scheme for the underlying rights involved to see if the particular proceedings for
which fees were sought were part of those statutory schemes. The Court has concluded
that certain state administrative proceedings do qualify under Title VII and that ... optional state tenure proceedings do not qualify under §§ 1983 and 1988 .... [Ihe enforcement scheme of Title VI aligns it solidly with Title VII rather than with § 1983. Resort to
optional administrative proceedings that are creatures of state law cannot be linked to the
congressional enforcement scheme under § 1983, so there is no apparent basis to infer that
Congress intended to include them within § 1988 when it drafted that statute. In contrast,
mandatory state procedures under Title VII and certain federal procedures under Title VI
are important parts of the statutory enforcement scheme.
Id
232. See Crest, 769 F.2d at 1030 n.12. ("[Title VI] applies to 'any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance,' and, while it is certainly possible for the states to have administrative
procedures that may be able to redress alleged violations of Title VI, those procedures are not mandated by Congress and presumably they can fare no better than the state-created procedures in
Webb.").
233. See Carey, 598 F.2d at 1257.
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13.
235. 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982).
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res judicata in the federal action. The state prevailed in the Oregon action;
plaintiffs prevailed in the federal action, and the issue was whether fees were
recoverable under section 1988 for plaintiffs' attorney's services in connection
with the state court proceedings. 236 The court held that such fees were available, since the federal court had required plaintiffs to apply to the state forum
for determination of whether a state law basis existed for vindicating the rights
which were the subject of the federal section 1983 claim. 237 It relied on the
reasoning in cases such as Carey and on legislative history evidencing an intent
that the civil rights fee-shifting statutes be broadly construed to achieve their
238
remedial purposes.
The court in Bartholomew noted the importance of abstention in furthering
federal/state cooperation. If fees were denied for state proceedings after abstention on federal civil rights claims, plaintiffs would attempt to avoid state proceedings, thus straining federal/state relations. 239 Therefore, in order to further
the important federal interest in abstention, courts must allow fees for state proceedings in abstention cases whether or not such proceedings resolve the underlying federal civil rights claim. 24°
A further distinction should be drawn for purposes of analyzing when fees
should be independently recoverable for cases resolved administratively. When
the Webb Court acknowledged that district courts have discretion to award fees
for a portion of work done at the state level of a type useful and ordinarily
necessary to the success of the federal litigation, it did so not because such state
proceedings were "actions or proceedings" within the meaning of section 1988.
In fact, it expressly said otherwise. 2 41 Rather, it did so because it had held in
236. Id. at 911-12.
237. Id. at 913-14.
238. Id. at 913 (citing Carey; Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980) and S. REP.
No. 1011, supra note 36, at 3).
239. Id. at 913. The House Report accompanying § 1988 explicitly permits the award of fees
when a court avoids resolution of a federal civil rights claim by deciding a pendent state claim, since
courts may endeavor to avoid resolution of constitutional issues whenever possible. The report relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), and United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). H. REP. No. 1558, supra note 28; see
Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1986).
240. See Pontarelli,788 F.2d at 51-52 (attorneys' fees awarded under § 1988 when plaintiffs who
filed federal action prevailed upon certification to state court on state law question). The court cites
Bartholomew with approval, id. at 51, and supports its holding with reference to the language in
Webb that fees may be awarded for work done in state proceedings useful and ordinarily necessary to
the successful outcome of the litigation. Id. at 52. "We have already noted that interpreting § 1988
to allow an award of attorneys' fees in a certification case will best harmonize Pennhurst with the
Pullman abstention doctrine and Congress' intent in enacting § 1988." Id. at 54.
Of course such cases may be viewed as traditional "catalyst cases" since in each instance the
federal litigation was filed before the state proceedings resolved the issue. See Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor, 663 F.2d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 1981) (fees allowed where attorney's work in
mooted Title VII action found to be catalyst to successful union arbitration), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1020 (1982); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff
considered prevailing party if "lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted [the defendant] to take
action" to correct unlawful practice).
241. Webb, 471 U.S. at 241 ("Administrative proceedings established to enforce tenure rights
created by state law simply are not any part of the proceedings to enforce § 1983.").
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Hensley v. Eckerhart242 that plaintiffs should receive attorneys' fees for work
related to the federal civil rights litigation, and district courts were entrusted to

determine which work was so related. The Webb approach is therefore an appropriate one for analyzing whether a prevailing party should be compensated

for work done at state proceedings that are related to the federal civil rights
claim. 243 But it is not an appropriate approach for analyzing whether work
done at a proceeding to enforce an enumerated section 1988 civil right, or a Title
VII right, should be so compensated. Sections 1988 and 706(k) say explicitly

that attorneys' fees are awardable in such instances. When the civil rights statute in question explicitly provides for an administrative mechanism for redress
of a right created by that statute, then a proceeding pursuant to such administrative mechanism is an "action or proceeding to enforce" such civil right. 244 Thus
242. 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983) (holding that fees were to be awarded from onset of attorneyclient relationship for work reasonably related to enforcement of federal civil rights).
243. Thus it would be appropriate for analyzing whether work done at a state or local proceeding related to the vindication of a Title VI claim should be compensated. A hypothetical example of
this would be if North Carolina law had forbidden discrimination based on race in any program
receiving state funding, and the Crest plaintiffs sought relief before the state agency or court charged
with enforcing such right prior to filing a federal court suit under Title VI.
In Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982), the court failed to make the
distinction between proceedings to enforce a federal civil rights claim and proceedings related to a
federal civil rights claim. In Ciechon the court affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees
to a party who had prevailed in federal court for time spent by counsel representing plaintiff before
the city personnel board. Id. at 524. The court based its holding on Carey, seeing no difference
between the state proceedings under Title VII, and the local proceedings at issue here. Id. at 525.
The court might have reached the same result through Webb reasoning, but not for the reasons it
gave.
Two commentators argue that the Carey rule should extend to nonmandatory state administrative proceedings in furtherance of a § 1983 claim such as in Blow v. Lascaris, 523 F. Supp. 913
(N.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 914 (1982), thus allowing a
suit under § 1988 solely to recover fees for a case resolved at an optional state administrative proceeding. Parness & Woodruff, FederalDistrictCourt Proceedingsto Recover Attorney's fees For Prevailing Parties on Section 1983 Claims in State Administrative Agencies, 18 GA. L. REV. 83, 94
(1983). The authors argue that the contrary result would encourage complainants to bypass available state administrative remedies, in conflict with principles of comity and federalism. Id at 95.
Those who prevailed at the state agency level could "seek in federal court additionalremedies for
already proven violations of section 1983 because the primary determiners of the violations did not
possess the authority to provide fully the remedies available under law," such as attorneys' fees. Id.
at 97. "Plaintiffs like Blow do not seek to circumvent section 1983; they seek instead no more than
the full remedies legally available for section 1983 claims on which they have already prevailed and
for which they have not yet had the opportunity to petition." Id. at 98. The authors advocate that
the full faith and credit clause would require federal courts to award fees based on successful state
agency actions. Id. at 102. While not unprincipled, the position advocated is at odds with the
Court's decision in Webb, and perhaps goes too far in involving federal courts in the vindication of
state-created rights. Since there is no evidence that Congress preferred vindication of federal civil
rights in state court proceedings, and much evidence that Congress intended to encourage the use of
federal forums, see H.R. REP. No. 1558, supranote 28, at 6; S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 36, at 1, 3
n.l, it would seem an unwarranted interference with state processes and state rights to allow prevailing parties, who could have pursued their claim in federal courts but chose not to, to nonetheless file
a federal lawsuit solely to recover attorneys' fees. Also, the authors fail to explain how the full faith
and credit clause would apply to requests for fees in cases resolved in state court without judgment.
244. The Department of Transportation regulations under which plaintiffs filed their administrative complaint were specifically established to enforce federal rights created by
Title VI [citing 2000d-l, which requires agencies to promulgate regulations to effectuate
the provisions of Title VII, so we conclude as a matter of normal statutory interpretation
that Congress meant to include them within § 1988's use of the term 'proceeding.'
Crest, 769 F.2d at 1030.
Similarly, a state equal employment proceeding pursuant to a deferral agreement, since it is
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a suit to recover fees under section 706(k) should lie in a Title VII case resolved
at any federal administrative proceeding2 4 s or state proceeding that is part of the
Title VII enforcement scheme. Similarly, a suit to recover attorneys' fees under
section 1988 should lie in a Title VI case resolved before a federal agency
charged with ensuring that recipients of federal funds do not discriminate based
on race, ethnicity, or national origin.
IV.

DISPELLING THE FALLACIES UNDERLYING A NARROW CONSTRUCTION
OF SECTION 1988

The Court in Crest based its decision on the pre-versus post-filing dichotomy, holding that section 1988 created no cause of action for a suit filed solely to
recover fees in a Title VI case resolved before the filing of the litigation. Opponents of expanding the applicability of fees to cases resolved administratively,
including petitioners and the United States as amicus curiae in Crest,24 6 have
raised a number of additional arguments for denying fees in such cases, aimed in
large measure at distinguishing fee claims under section 1988 from fee claims
under section 706(k). These include the mandatory/optional distinction between Title VII and other civil rights statutes, the concern that attorneys' fee
litigation will overburden the federal courts, and the apprehension that allowing
fees would frustrate congressional intent as to how the federal administrative
processes should function. None of these concerns compels the conclusion that
fees should not be available under section 1988 for Title VI cases resolved administratively. Rather, exposing the fallaciousness of these assumptions establishes a foundation for the need for corrective legislation proposed in Part V.
A.

The Fallacy of the Mandatory/OptionalDistinction

Although it was not a distinction on which the Court relied in Crest, a
number of cases have distinguished the claim for fees in Carey from other claims
for fees based on the requirement of Title VII that a claimant first pursue administrative remedies prior to filing suit.2 47 Why is there such a requirement in
provided for by Title VII, would be a proceeding to enforce Title VII. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 61-62.
Contrast this to work done on a grievance procedure, related to a civil rights claim which resolves a
matter before an administrative complaint has been fied. See Mertz v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 1258 (1lth
Cir.) (no fees awarded for federal employee Title VII claim resolved in a prefiling grievance procedure), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986). In such a case, the Webb "ordinary and necessary" analysis may be appropriate.
245. Such proceedings would include both those before the EEOC, or, in the case of federal
employees, before the agencies charged with the discrimination.
246. See Brief for Petitioners at 7, Amicus Brief of the United States at III, Crest, 479 U.S. 6
(1986) (No. 85-767).
247. See Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing claim for
fees for Title VII claim resolved administratively from claim in Crest, based on mandatory preffling
requirement that parties submit claim to administrative agency); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,
1011 n.14 (1984) ("The difference between Carey and this case is that in Carey the statute that
authorized fees, Title VII, also required a plaintiff to pursue available state administrative remedies.
In contrast, nothing in § 1983 requires that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 suit."); Eggers v. Bullitt County School Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 895-96 (6th Cir. 1988)
(distinguishing fees for EHCA claim resolved administratively from Crest based on mandatory nature of administrative proceedings); Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor, 663 F.2d 443, 453 (3d
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Title VII and none in Title VI, and what difference does it make in analyzing the
fee question? While the presence of the requirement in Title VII argues force-

fully for applying section 706(k) to a request for attorneys' fees for a case resolved in a mandatory state or federal equal employment opportunity

proceeding, 248 the absence of a similar requirement in Title VI does not support
the conclusion that fees should not be available for a Title VI case resolved in an

optional federal agency proceeding. 24 9 "The question," said the Second Circuit
in Carey, "is whether section 706(k) encompasses fee awards to complaining

parties who succeed at a step in the statutory scheme before they are forced to
litigate their claims in federal court. ' 250 Section 1988 poses the same question.
The question can not be answered simply by ascertaining whether the civil rights
statute in question requires prior resort to administrative remedies.
The relevance in the attorneys' fee analysis of a requirement that a com-

plainant first submit her complaint to an administrative agency is the bearing
such a requirement has in revealing congressional purpose and intent regarding
the use of such administrative processes. By enacting the Title VII exhaustion
requirement, Congress explicitly expressed a preference for the prelitigation, informal resolution of equal employment discrimination complaints. By providing
for administrative enforcement of Title VI, Congress expressed a preference for
informal resolution of racial discrimination complaints as well. 251 The congruence of two factors explains the absence of any requirement in Title VI that a
complainant first pursue administrative remedies before a federal lawsuit: Congress' intent that the threat of termination of federal financial assistance by the
funding agency would be the primary tool for enforcing Title VI, 252 and the
253
absence of an explicit provision in the statute for a private right of action.
Cir. 1981) (Adams, J., dissenting) (would disallow fees for Title VII case resolved through nonmandatory union arbitration), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 509 F. Supp.
226, 230 (D.D.C. 1981) (no attorneys' fees for ADEA action resolved administratively because of
absence of exhaustion requirement), aff'd, 690 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But see Bleakley v. Jekyll
Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 243 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (allows fees for ADEA action resolved administratively because of importance of federal-state enforcement scheme under ADEA).
248. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 65.
249. The Supreme Court in Crest makes no mention of the mandatory/optional distinction, in
all likelihood because it chooses to decide the case on the basis of the pre-/post.filing dichotomy.
The Fourth Circuit in Crest rejected the relevance of the distinction. 769 F.2d at 1030.
250. Carey, 598 F.2d at 1257.
251. See Crest, 769 F.2d at 1027 n.4, 1030 (describing importance of administrative procedures
in Congress' Title VI enforcement scheme, including specific Title VI regulations enacted by the
Department of Transportation designed to encourage resolution of Title VI complaints through
"voluntary means." 49 C.F.R. §§ 21.11(d)(1), 21.13(a) (1984)).
252. See Silver, supra note 2, at 522.
253. In fact, until recently, confusion abounded among the lower courts as to whether Title VI
required exhaustion of administrative remedies. See, eg., Crest, 769 F.2d at 1030 (unnecessary to
decide exhaustion question); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 689 F.2d 1161, 1163 (3d
Cir. 1982) (district court had ordered the Office of Civil Rights to conduct an investigation, and
operated on the premise that exhaustion was required), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052 (1983); see also
Silver, supra note 2, at 510 n.176 (lower courts have differed in their conclusions as to whether
exhaustion is required). This confusion was shared by HEW, the primary enforcement agency,
which had claimed that it had primary jurisdiction over Title VI claims, see Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687-88 n.8 (1979), thus suggesting the strength of the federal interest in
administrative resolution of civil rights complaints. In holding that a private right of action did lie
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Until the Court's decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago,2 54 the availability
of a private right of action under federal antidiscrimination laws such as Title VI

was in dispute. 25 5 Both Congress-through enactment of section 1988-and the
Court have subsequently made clear that a private right of action is a necessary

and appropriate means for redressing violations of Title VI and for providing
2 56
remedies other than termination of federal funding to aggrieved individuals.

Congress' failure to require a plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies prior to
filing a Title VI suit, however, is neither surprising, nor a basis for interpreting

section 1988 to disallow fee-shifting for cases resolved administratively.
Given Congress' desire for consistent interpretation of its attorneys' fees
provisions, 257 a simple hypothetical will demonstrate the illogic of allowing fees
to a Title VII complainant who prevails before the EEOC, and disallowing fees

to a complainant who resolves a comparable complaint with a federal funding
agency. The EEOC and the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education (OCR) have concurrent jurisdiction, due to overlapping cov-

erage in Title VII and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title
IX), over employment discrimination on the basis of sex in educational pro-

grams receiving federal funds. 258 Jane Doe, an Associate Professor of Medicine
at Malesonly Medical School, files a complaint with both the EEOC and
OCR 259 alleging that Malesonly discriminated against her on the basis of sex in
the terms and conditions of her employment. Specifically, she alleges that she

receives less compensation and is required to accept more responsibilities than
are her similarly situated male colleagues. Dr. Doe is represented by John Roe,
under Title IX without any requirement that plaintiff first exhaust administrative remedies, Cannon
did nothing to detract from the strength of the federal interest in federal enforcement.
254. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
255. The legislative history... makes clear that the supporters of the [1976 attorneys' fee
amendment to § 1988] did not intend it to amend Title IX to include an express cause of
action where none existed before. Instead, they clearly only meant to provide attorney's
fees in the event that that statute as it had always existed implicitly created a cause of
action ....
On the other hand, the language added... and the legislative history surrounding it, do indicate that many "members of Congress may have assumed that private
suits were authorized under" Title IX and, more importantly, that many Members felt
that private enforcement of title IX was entirely consistent with, and even necessary to, the
enforcement of Title IX and the other statutes listed in § 1988.
Id. at 686 n.7 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1079 (1976)).
256. See id. at 717 (finding private right of action under Title IX); Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 (1984) (same under Section 504); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (same under Title VI). An additional explanation for the existence of a pre-filing requirement in Title VII and its absence in Title VI may be found in an examnation of the primary purposes of the two statutes. As this author has written elsewhere, a primary
purpose of Title VII was the resolution of employment discrimination disputes between individual
employees and employers, while the primary purpose of Title VI was the eradicationof discrimination throughout programs receiving federal funds. See Silver, supra note 2, at 521-24.
257. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
258. The allocation of investigation responsibilities has in fact been resolved through executive
order and interagency agreement between EEOC and OCR. See Exec. Order No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R.
263 (1978); Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1155
(1982) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978); EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) 1930 (field notes issued Jan.
3, 1986, and Mar. 3, 1986). The existence, however, of such an agreement entered into voluntarily
by the agencies in question is irrelevant in analyzing the proper interpretation of congressional enactments, and thus the hypothetical following in the text is posed as if no such agreements existed.
259. Malesonly, we posit, is a recipient of federal financial assistance.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

an attorney with the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. Roe assisted
Doe in the preliminary investigation of her allegations and the drafting of her
complaints.
Under the mandatory/optional analysis, Doe's right to recover attorneys'
fees upon successful resolution of her complaint will turn on whether the EEOC
or OCR is the first to reach an agreement between the parties. If the EEOC
finds probable cause and successfully conciliates an agreement between the parties, Doe would be authorized, under the Carey Court's interpretation of section
706(k), 2 60 to file an action in federal court solely to recover her attorneys' fees.
If, however, OCR completes its investigation before the EEOC completes theirs,
makes a finding that Malesonly did discriminate on the basis of sex, and
Malesonly agrees to make such changes as are necessary to remedy the violation,
then, under the analysis of courts relying on the mandatory/optional distinction,
attorneys' fees would not be available to Doe under section 1988, regardless of
whether she had previously filed a Title IX claim in federal district court. 26 1
Another fallacy of the mandatory/optional distinction emerges upon closer
examination of Title VII's requirements concerning submission of a complaint to
agency processes and the realities of EEOC practices and procedures. Title VII
does not require a charging party to await the eventual outcome of EEOC proceedings before she fies a lawsuit; rather, if the EEOC has not resolved the
charge within 180 days of filing, or, in the case of a charge referred to a state or
local agency, 240 days, the charging party is entitled to receive a notice of right
262
to sue from the EEOC, enabling her to proceed immediately to federal court.
If fees were only awarded for attorneys' services during the first 180 or 240 days
when proceedings were mandatory, then parties would abandon the administrative proceedings and ifie in federal court at the earliest possible moment in order
to protect their right to fees. The Carey Court rejected the suggestion that if
plaintiff failed to abandon her administrative remedies after 240 days she would
be precluded subsequently from recovering all her fees under section 706(k).
Since it is rare that complete relief could be provided within that period, disal"would
lowing fees for administrative proceedings after 240 days, said the court,
263
undermine Congress' intent to encourage full use of state remedies."
Thus the Court in Carey was moved less by the existence of the requirement
that plaintiff first submit her claim to the state agency than by Congress' desire
"to encourage full use of state remedies." Similarly, in order to ensure that Title
VI complainants do not abandon administrative remedies that Congress in260. It is important to keep in mind that we are focusing on the cases that have distinguished
§ 706(k) from § 1988 based on the mandatory/voluntary distinction, rather than on the Crest
Court's suggestion that the distinction is whether a matter is resolved before or after federal litigation to enforce a civil rights claim has been filed.
261. Under the Crest Court's analysis, however, had she previously filed such a Title IX lawsuit,
then, after the successful agency resolution of her complaint, she could petition the court for fees for
her attorney's services at the agency proceedings. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
concurring in part
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). See Webb, 471 U.S. at 252-53 n.15 (Brennan, J.,
and dissenting in part).
263. Carey, 447 U.S. at 66 n.6.
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tended for them to use, attorneys' fees should be recoverable under section 1988
for Title VI cases resolved administratively.
B.

The Fallacy of the Burden on the Courts and the Selfless Attorney

While scholars and jurists may disagree on the extent to which federal
courts are overworked, 264 none advocate inundating the federal courts with unnecessary litigation. Critics of expanding the applicability of section 1988 to

cases resolved administratively have feared an explosion of fees litigation will so
266
burden the federal dockets. 265 To the contrary, the Court's analysis in Carey,

the realities of practice, and common sense suggest that quite the opposite is
true. Disallowance of fees for Title VI cases resolved administratively will likely

result in the filing of more, not less litigation, either as protective litigation in
conjunction with the filing of an administrative complaint, or as an alternative to

such a complaint.

26 8
and the dissent in Carey269
Both the majority in Crest2 67 and Webb
profess a belief that civil rights attorneys are selflessly devoted to their clients,

and would not make choices influenced by whether or not they may ultimately
be able to recover attorneys' fees from losing defendants. 270 The problems with
264. See Silver, supra note 2, at 560 n.460.
265. See Carey, 598 F.2d at 1262-63 (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (allowing suit solely to recover
fees "promotes the federal litigation which Congress intended to bypass... in the federal courts,
where district judges are already inundated with calendars of increasing weight and complexity"); cf.
Sullivan v. Department of Labor, 663 F.2d at 454-55 (Adams, J., dissenting) ("Because of today's
ruling, employees aggrieved by discriminatory practices may well file Title VII claims as an adjunct
to already-initiated arbitration proceedings simply to ensure the eventual award of a counsel fee."
Judge Adams' objection extended to allowing fees for proceedings other than litigation whether or
not a federal suit had been filed on the merits.).
266. 447 U.S. at 66 n.6.
267. 479 U.S. at 14-15.
268. Of course, competent counsel will be motivated by the interests of the client to pursue
state administrative remedies when they are available and counsel believes that they may
prove successful. We cannot assume that an attorney would advise the client to forgo an
available avenue of relief solely because § 1988 does not provide for attorney's fees for
work performed in the state administrative forum.
Webb, 471 U.S. at 241 n.15.
Yet, the majority in Webb argued that attorneys should be compensated for work done at the
administrative level which contributed to the success of the subsequent litigation because "[a] contrary rule would provide an unwise incentive for every potential litigant to commence a federal
action at the earliest possible moment in order to steer himself into § 1988's safe harbor." Id. at 24950 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court notes that Congress was
motivated to provide attorneys' fees for cases settled out of court so that "[a] 'prevailing' party
should not be penalized for seeking an out-of-court settlement, thus helping to lessen docket 6ongestion." Id. at 252 n.13 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 28, at 7).
269. 447 U.S. at 71 (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting based on dissenting opinion below of
Mulligan, J., 598 F.2d at 1263-64).
270. See discussion of Crest, supra note 118-19 and accompanying text; see also Carey, 598 F.2d
at 1264 (Mulligan, J., dissenting) ("Attorneys who have specialized in the civil rights field are zealous and dedicated. Their performance will not be affected by this decision one way or the other.")
Justices White and Rehnquist dissented from the Court's decision in Carey based on the opinion of
Judge Mulligan. But see Rowe, The Supreme Court on Attorney Fee Awar4 1985 and 1986 Terms:
Economics, Ethics and Ex Ante Analysis, 1 GEO. J. oF LEGAL ETHIcS 621, 631 (1988).
For any number of reasons, from pride to fear of disrepute or professional sanction, from
conscientious adherence to ethical obligations to being adequately paid, attorneys may well
perform in full accord with the requirements of zealous and competent representation. For
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this are at least twofold. First, what is best for the client is also likely to be what

is best for the attorney; the recoverability of attorneys' fees is in the client's
interest no less than in the attorney's. Private attorneys, apart from whatever

pro bono matters they may undertake, practice law to earn a living, and will not
undertake representation in most instances where they cannot expect compensation. 27 1 The overriding purpose of the fee-shifting statutes was to provide access

to counsel for those who could not afford to pay for counsel's services to redress
suffered discrimination. In fact, if the client can afford to pay for the attorney's

services, then the client profits more from the hope of eventually recovering such
fees from the defendant than does her attorney. Public attorneys, who make up
a large percentage of the civil rights bar, 272 face ever increasing cutbacks in
funding. 273 Recovery of attorneys' fees may provide the only opportunity for
expanding their representation to meet the needs of the civil rights community. 274 Second, an attorney's decision to pursue one avenue of relief over an-

other, or both simultaneously, is neither unethical nor inappropriate. Such was
the assessment of Justice Brennan in his Crest dissent:

As a practical matter, the Court's position will lead civil rights claimants to do the following: (1) file a federal civil action, (2) pursue the
available administrative agency remedy, (3) obtain a stay from the fedcontrary reasons, singly or in combination, they also may fail to do so.... But the complexities of human motivation make it hard to justify the Court's ostensible presumption
that attorneys will conduct themselves as the ethical canons dictate come what may.
Id.
271. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 758 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("lawyers are in the
business of practicing law, and... like other business people, they are and must be concerned with
earning a living"); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 447 (1983) (Brennan, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("the legislative history of § 1988 reveals Congress' basic goal that attorneys
should view civil rights cases as essentially equivalent to other types of work they could do, even
though the monetary recoveries in civil rights cases... would seldom be equivalent to recoveries in
most private-law litigation .... As nearly as possible, market standards should prevail, for that is the
best way of ensuring that competent counsel will be available to all persons with bona fide civil rights
claims."); see also Evans, 475 U.S. at 741 n.34 ("We are cognizant of the possibility that decisions by
individual clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the long run, diminish
lawyers' expectations of statutory fees in civil rights cases [and] the pool of lawyers willing to represent plaintiffs in such cases might shrink, constricting the 'effective access to the judicial process' for
persons with civil rights grievances which the Fees Act was intended to provide.").
272. See Evans, 475 U.S. at 755 n.7. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (nonlucrative nature of civil rights
practice has resulted in few private attorneys handling civil rights work; civil rights plaintiffs rely
largely on legal aid organizations); see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware County Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 107 S. Ct. 3078, 3096 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("it is unrealistic to think that 600
public-interest lawyers in 90 public-interest law centers around the country would be able to pick up
the slack from the rest of the bar, with its approximately 400,000 lawyers").
273. See Hearingson Federal Fundingfor Legal Services Programs and the Effect of Federal
Budget on Education Before the Subcommittee on Judiciary and Education, and Committee on the
District of Columbia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1981) (statement of Chairman Dymally regarding
25% reduction in appropriations for the Legal Services Corporation for Fiscal Years 1982-83); Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriationsfor
1984: HearingsBefore the Subcom. on Commerce, State, and the Judiciary Appropriation of the
House Committee of Appropriations,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 527-76 (1983) (statement of David Landau, American Civil Liberties Union, regarding 28% reduction in the number of lawyers as a result
of the 25% reduction in funding to the Legal Services Corporation).
274. See Evans, 475 U.S. at 755 n.7 (legal aid organizations are short of resources and depend
heavily on statutory fees); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that awards
of fees against state defendants under § 1988 to state funded legal aid attorneys "permit replenishment of the funds available for the organization's work").
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eral court to file a fee petition after prevailing before the agency.
Under these circumstances, there will rarely be any doubt that some
portion of the work before the agency was "both useful and of a type
Conseordinarily necessary" to successful litigation of the case275....
quently, some fee award should ordinarily be allowed.
Furthermore, those concerned about a proliferation of fee litigation following successful resolution of civil rights cases at the administrative level should
bear in mind that the existence of a right does not mean that litigation is necessary in order to satisfy the right.2 76 Not everyone who is owed money need sue
to recover it. The fact that a suit must be filed in order to compel fees does not

mean that the parties will not usually agree short of litigation to a fee.277 There
is no evidence that a spate of section 706(k) attorneys' fee litigation for cases

resolved administratively inundated the federal dockets after the Court's Carey
decision. 278 The parties can find sufficient guidance as to how to calculate a
reasonable fee2 7 9 to enable them to do so with or without the assistance of the

agency that helped resolve the underlying civil rights dispute2 80 and without the
assistance of a federal judge. Negotiations can frequently resolve disagreements

275. Crest, 479 U.S. at 23 n.5 (citing Webb, 471 U.S. at 243, other citations omitted). That
attorneys will heed his advice is evidenced by a presentation at the 1987 Practising Law Institute on
the subject of attorneys' fees: "perhaps, the most practical observations drawn from [Crest] are those
of Justice Brennan in his dissent [quoting passage from Brennan]. While the [Crest] majority assumed that counsel would either file suit or seek administrative relief, Justice Brennan has provided
a practice tip on how to do both." Berger, PrevailingParty Concepts in Court Awards of Attorneys'
Fees, in COURT AWARDS oF ATroRNEYs' FEEs LITIGATING AN1TrrRusT, CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC
INTEREST, AND SECURIES CASES 41, 87 (PLI 1987).
If Crest applies as well to statutory schemes like Title VII with mandatory administrative proceedings, attorneys might decline to represent plaintiffs raising claims under such statutes out of
concern that no fees would be recoverable should their clients prevail short of filing federal suit. See
Note, North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc.: The
Supreme Court DisallowsAttorneys' Feesfor Administrative Enforcement of Civil Rights, 2 ADMIN.
L.J. 165, 187-88 (1988).
276. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 135, at 128 ("Most of us live our lives in conscious submission
to rules of law, yet without necessity of resort to the courts to ascertain our rights and duties.").
277. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) ("A request for attorney's fees should
not result in a second major litigation. Ideally, of course, litigants will settle the amount of a fee.");
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 902 n.19 (1984) ("Parties to civil rights litigation in particular should
make a conscientious effort, where a fee award is to be made, to resolve any differences."); see also
H.R. REP No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985) ("Usually, the amount of such fees... [under the
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1985] will be agreed to by the public agency. If no agreement is possible, the parent may file a law suit for the limited purpose of receiving an award of
reasonable fees.").
278. In fact, research has revealed surprisingly few cases concerning suits for fees under § 706(k)
resolved administratively. But see Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1988).
Apparently, counsel involvement at the administrative level in EEOC cases is not routine, and in
those cases where charging parties are represented by counsel, the cases usually advance to litigation
before they are resolved. Telephone conversation with Laurie Young, Associate General Counsel,
EEOC District Office, Indiana, (November 20, 1987). Practically speaking, attorneys are not going
to rush to represent complainants in most run of the mill Title VI complaints, because the magnitude
of the cases, even with the availability of fees, will not make them worthwhile from a remuneration
perspective. It is the big cases like Crest where good representation is most critical that will-and
should-be affected.
279. The decisional law on this subject is legion, and ever growing. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987) (plurality opinion that
§ 304 of Clean Air Act does not permit enhancement of a reasonable lodestar fee to compensate for
an attorney's assuming the risk of loss and of nonpayment).
280. While the EEOC has promulgated regulations on attorneys' fees for federal employees who
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between the parties about fees, as well as disagreements about discrimination.
Furthermore, even if the fee question were not resolved short of federal court
litigation, such litigation would likely be less costly than the projected28protective
1
federal court litigation precipitated by the Court's holding in Crest.
If fear of the proliferation of litigation is unable to justify the denial of fees
for cases resolved administratively, then there is no logical reason to hinge the
fee question on whether a case is resolved before rather than after the filing of
litigation related to the administrative enforcement proceeding. Fees should be
available not only for parties who prevail on Title VI claims in federal court, but
also for parties who successfully avoid the need for federal litigation by reaching
resolution at the administrative level. Recall Jane Doe and her claim of Title
VII and Title IX employment discrimination. 282 Under the Court's reasoning in
Crest, if Jane Doe's attorney files a Title IX action in federal court before the
Office for Civil Rights reaches a successful resolution of her complaint, then she
will be entitled to recover attorneys' fees. 283 If, however, her attorney fails to do
so, then no action will lie for attorneys' fees once Malesonly Medical School has
agreed to comply voluntarily. Under the Crest rule, the careful attorney, the
"good lawyer," should routinely file a protective lawsuit. Were attorneys' fees
recoverable for cases resolved administratively, the parties would file a federal
lawsuit for Title IX cases resolved administratively only in those instances where
the parties were unable to reach agreement on the fee question. Jane Doe and
Malesonly might agree on a reasonable attorney's fee award as part of their
settlement of her complaint. If they do not agree, then Jane Doe, under a rule
contrary to that of Crest, could apply to federal court to fix a reasonable fee
amount. But why trouble the court unless it becomes necessary?
C. The Fallacy that Fees Mean Formalization

On one hand, the Court has failed to acknowledge the importance of Congress' interest in informal, negotiated resolutions of discrimination complaints in
its narrow interpretation of the reach of section 1988.284 The Webb Court even
suggests that the 1964 Act's legislative history indicates Congress' preference for
judicial enforcement as the means to redress civil rights violations. 285 On the
have prevailed before the agency, see infra note 307, the agency has no policy guidance for feeshifting in the resolution of charges brought by private parties.
281. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 257-61.
283. I recognize the possibility that Crest could be read more narrowly. The Court never says
that fees will automatically be available for all work done by the attorney in connection with the
administrative proceeding, merely because a federal lawsuit had been filed. However, given the holding in Carey, the reasoning in Webb that fees should be available for work usually necessary as part
of the litigation, and the Court's focus on timing in Crest, it appears that the range of discretion
available to the district court to award fees for administrative work, as long as a protective federal

action has been filed, equals the district court's discretion in deciding generally what work is, and
what work is not, compensable under § 1988.

284. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
285. Compare Webb, 471 U.S. at 241 n.16 (purpose of § 1988 was to promote enforcement of
civil rights through judicial process) with id at 251-52 (Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting in part
and concurring in part) ("A rule requiring potential plaintiffs absolutely to bypass administrative
proceedings if they wished to become eligible for attorney's fees would create skewed incentives that
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other hand, the Court suggests in Crest that to allow fees for cases resolved
administratively would create a disincentive to defendants to agree to resolve
cases at the administrative level, a disincentive at odds with the purposes of the
civil rights laws. 286 What the Court failed to understand is that allowing fees in
such cases does not threaten administrative informality; it merely allows parties
and their attorneys a choice between more or less formal approaches to resolving
discrimination disputes, unencumbered by the fee issue.
1. The Fallacy that Fee-Shifting Will Discourage Administrative Settlement
The argument is that defendants will be discouraged from agreeing to comply at the agency level if such agreement means exposure for plaintiff's attorneys' fees. There are at least two problems with this position. First, even if this
is sometimes so, it is also the case that as far as attorneys' fees are concerned, it
is always less costly for the defendant to resolve a matter sooner rather than
later. 287 Therefore, early compliance will likely be in the defendant's interest, if
it is to comply voluntarily at all. 288 This is true whether the defendant isliable
for fees from the moment the administrative complaint is filed, or whether liability only attaches upon the filing of a lawsuit. But a rule which does not require
fees for cases resolved short of judicial litigation will provide no incentive for a
defendant to agree to resolve a discrimination problem sooner rather than later
in the administrative process. Further, not allowing fees for cases resolved at the
administrative level reduces the incentive for plaintiffs to negotiate resolutions
2 89
before the filing of a judicial complaint.
Congress could not possibly have intended ....Unless we are willing to conclude that Congress not
only intended not to require reliance on state administrative proceedings, but positively to discourage
resort to such proceedings in all circumstances in the § 1983 context, reasonable standards for limited recovery of fees should be fashioned."); see extended discussion supra note 134.
See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 445-46 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Congress could, of course, have provided public funds or Government attorneys
for litigating private civil rights claims, but it chose to 'limi[t] the growth of the enforcement bureaucracy,' Senate Report 4, by continuing to rely on the private bar and by making defendants bear the
full burden of paying for enforcement of their civil rights obligations."); S. REP. No. 1011, supra
note 36, at 4 ("These fee-shifting provisions have been successful in enabling vigorous enforcement of
modern civil rights legislation, while at the same time limiting the growth of the enforcement
bureaucracy.").
286. "Moreover, our holding creates a legitimate incentive for potential civil rights defendants to
resolve disputes expeditiously, rather than risk the attorney's fees liability connected to civil rights
litigation." Crest, 479 U.S. at 15.
287. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 443 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (§ 1988 "gives defendants strong
incentives to avoid arguable civil rights violations in the first place and to make concessions in hope
of an early settlement").
288. There are, of course, other factors which might influence a defendant to delay settlement,
separate and apart from the issue of attorneys' fees. See Silver, supra note 2, at 550-52. Yet the
greater the exposure to attorneys' fees, the greater the incentive to settle. See, eg., S. REP.No. 112,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 1798, 1806
("the cap on publicly funded attorneys' fees would deter schools from settling cases expeditiously.
Schools not faced with having to pay more substantial attorneys' fees at the fair market rate will
have an incentive to draw judicial proceedings out in an attempt to force plaintiffs to abandon their

cases").
289. Cf Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978) (upholding award of fees to plaintiffs
whose suit prompted change in prison conditions).
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Second, alternatives are available for dealing with the concern that respon-

dents will refuse to settle cases where the merits may be unclear but the costother than attorneys' fees-would be negligible. If a respondent chooses to settle

a complaint for its nuisance value, settlement could include an agreement of a
fee waiver,290 or otherwise minimize the cost of attorneys' fees. Furthermore, it

is not at all clear that it furthers any legitimate goal for respondents to agree to
settle cases having no merit. If respondents have not in fact engaged in any

discriminatory practice, then it furthers no purpose other than avoiding the nuisance of further proceedings for them to agree to settle. 29 1 Thus, if allowing

attorneys' fees for cases resolved administratively creates a disincentive to respondents to. settle nonmeritorious cases, that is not especially troublesome.
This is especially so as balanced against the importance to plaintiffs of allowing
fees for meritorious cases resolved administratively.
2.

The Fallacy that Private Attorneys Have No Place

in Administrative Proceedings
Another objection frequently voiced to allowing attorneys' fees for cases
resolved administratively is that the administrative agency obviates the need for
private counsel, both because of the relative informality and less adversarial nature of its procedures 292 and because agency attorneys can adequately protect

the interests of the complainant. 293 The problem with this suggestion is that it
ignores the similarity between the judicial litigation process and the complaint
[We are sympathetic to defendants' policy argument that fear of a significant attorney's fee
award may force defendants to continue litigating an issue not because they wish to establish a legal principle or avoid meeting plaintiffs' concerns, but solely to escape if possible
from onerous attorney's fees. But the argument cuts both ways. If defendants may refuse
to settle a case and accept the cost of continued litigation to avoid paying attorney's fees, it
is equally likely that plaintiffs' counsel, rather than receive no compensation at all for their
efforts, would be willing to continue the litigation on the chance that they might cut if not
eliminate their losses. We cannot decide this issue based on such honest but speculative
concerns.

Id. at 281-82.
290. In Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), the Court held that defendants can condition
settlement offers on the waiver of § 1988 attorneys' fees. There are numerous objections to allowing
fee waivers in meritorious cases. See, eg., id. at 754 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, 33., dissenting)
("It seems obvious that allowing defendants in civil rights cases to condition settlement of the merits
on a waiver of statutory attorney's fees will diminish lawyers' expectations of receiving fees and
decrease the willingness of lawyers to accept civil rights cases."); see also Comment, Settlement
Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver ofAttorneys' Fees:Policy, Legal, andEthical Considerations,131 U.
PA. L. REV. 793, 795, 815-16 (1983) (arguing that conditional fee waivers frustrate goals of Fees
Act); Note, Evans v. Jeff D.: No JudicialProhibitionof Coerced Waivers ofAttorney's Fees Under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 24 Hous. L. Rav. 1020, 1028-32, 1036-37 (arguing
that fee waiver settlements impair civil rights enforcement). The Court's decision that they are
allowable, however, discredits its suggestion in Crest that a contrary holding would decrease the
incentive for defendants to resolve compliance problems voluntarily.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, Congress might well decide to overrule the Court's
holding in JeffD., see Note, supra, at 1035-36, perhaps simultaneously with overruling its holding in
Crest. Concerns about creating possible disincentives for defendants to settle disputes of debatable
merit could be addressed by Congress at that time. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
291. See Silver, supra note 2, at 525-26.
292. See, eg., Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 324 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("EEOC's procedures
and authority usually make it unnecessary for an employee to use an attorney's services").
293. See, eg., Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253, 1261-63 (2d Cir. 1979)
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resolution process at the agency level, and it assumes a function for agency attorneys which is not theirs to perform. The processes of discovery and informed
negotiation are essential and often dispositive phases in litigation, and cases are
294
frequently, if not usually, resolved without the necessity for a formal trial.
Few would suggest that clients can handle these preliminary phases of litigation
satisfactorily without counsel. Similarly, most Title VI complaints are resolved
during the investigative and negotiation phases of the administrative enforcement process. 295 Since important decisions are made and rights compromised at
this juncture of the administrative process, the need for counsel is no less critical
296
than at a similar juncture of the judicial process.

The need for counsel is not satisfied by the existence of agency attorneys.
Agency attorneys do not guard the interests of the complainant, as the Court
recognized in Carey.29 7 In a Title VI administrative proceeding, the agency at-

torney's client is the agency, not the complainant, and her responsibilities are to
ensure that a complete and competent investigation leads to a well-founded conclusion as to whether a violation did or did not occur. 298 Since the agency attor-

ney is not the complainant's advocate, she can not protect the complainant's
interests over those of the respondent. Thus, without private counsel, there is no
advocate to guard the complainant's interests in the negotiation process, espe(Mulligan, J., dissenting) (division attorney adequately protects interests of charging party), aff'd,
447 U.S. 54 (1980).
294. See, eg., Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 59
COLUM. L. REv. 1115, 1124 (1959) (majority of New York City negligence claimants receive settlements within a year after accident).
295. See Silver, supra note 2, at 571.
296. Cf Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
Settlement of the charge is possible at any stage of the proceedings and agreements may,
accordingly, have to be negotiated and rights may be waived ....
Furthermore, the
agency's representative is likely to be a lawyer, which can only serve to exacerbate a nonlawyer plaintiff's disadvantage. Any realistic assessment of Title VII administrative proceedings requires the conclusion that- despite the fact they are not strictly adversarialan employee would often be ill-advised to embark thereon without legal assistance. Indeed,
the services a lawyer may be called upon to perform at the administrative level are well
illustrated by the instant litigation.
Id.
297. Carey, 447 U.S. at 69-70. The argument that private counsel were unnecessary because of
the existence of Division of Human Rights attorneys was raised and rejected. The Court noted that
the state agency had encouraged complainants to obtain private counsel due to resource problems in
the agency. The Court further concluded that the agency attorney
has no obligation to the complainant as a client. In fact, at times the position of the Division may be detrimental to the interests of the complainant and to enforcement of federal
rights. Representation by a private attorney thus assures development of a complete factual record at the investigative stage and at the administrative hearing. At both, settlement
is possible and is encouraged. A Division employee cannot act as the complainant's attorney for purposes of advising him whether to accept a settlement. Retention of private counsel will help assure that federal rights are not compromised in the conciliation process.
Id. at 70. It is interesting to note that the United States appeared as amicus in Carey arguing for the
need for fee recovery for private counsel in the administrative proceedings; however, in Crest it took
the opposite position, see infra note 304.
298. See Silver, supranote 2, at 517 (OCR findings must be legally supportable); Carey, 598 F.2d
at 1258 ("the [New York Human Rights Law] provides for Division lawyers to present the case 'in
support of the complaint,' not in support of the plaintiff"); cf Doe v. New York Univ., 511 F. Supp.
606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting counsel's role in reviewing administrative findings).
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cially if this process occurs before the investigation is completed. 299 Even if the
investigation yields a finding of violation, the agency attorney's interests may
diverge substantially from those of the complainant. The agency may conclude
that the compliance problem can be resolved with less relief, or different relief,
than the complainant is seeking. 30 The agency may even conclude that the
violation can be remedied without the respondent providing any individual relief
to the complainant. 30 1 The complainant's need for his own representative to
protect his interests at each phase of the administrative enforcement process
may approach his need for legal representation in the litigation process in federal
court. The more complex the alleged violation, the more vital is the role of
complainant's counsel.
The facts in Crest demonstrate the importance of private counsel in the
Title VI administrative proceedings. The role played by Crest's attorney in the
administrative proceedings, which included filing the seventeen page complaint
setting forth the factual and legal bases of the Title VI violation,3 0 2 providing
extensive materials to the agency to document the violation and, after the
agency's finding of probable cause, and with the agency's encouragement, conducting successful negotiations with the respondent to resolve the compliance
issues, 30 3 belies any argument that the work performed by Crest's counsel was
3 4
not critical to the favorable outcome of the administrative proceedings.
I do not mean to overstate the case in order to refute the suggestion that
attorneys are unnecessary at the administrative level and therefore their services
299. In fact, the need for private counsel is even more compelling in the Title VI administrative
proceedings than in a Title VII proceeding before the EEOC, because of the former's relative lack of
protection of the complainant's rights throughout the agency's processes. See Silver, supranote 2, at

558, 559.
300. See Silver, supra note 2 at 558-59.
301. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41 (1979) (no guarantee that
administrative proceedings will protect individual interests of complainant).
302. Joint Appendix 73-89, Crest, 479 U.S. 6 (No. 85-767).
303. Respondents' Brief at 34-36, Crest, 479 U.S. 6 (No. 85-767).
304. This evidence also discredits the argument made by amicus United States that the Title VI
administrative process was not intended to protect private interests, and therefore a complainant is
not a "party" to any such "proceedings," as required by § 1988 for purposes of recovering attorneys'
fees. Amicus Brief at 12-15, Crest. The United States' argument has not received much credence in
the courts. But see Arriola v. Harville, 781 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 1986) ("interested individuals
and groups have none of the rights of parties" for purposes of Voting Rights Act fee-shifting provisions), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 84 (1986). The United States attempts to distinguish the status of the
charging party in Title VII proceedings from that of the Title VI complainant who it describes as
merely a deliverer of information to the Title VI enforcement agency, arguing that because Title VI
is rooted in the spending power and requires the consent of the recipient of funds, the government's
responsibility is to strike a balance between "protecting" its contractee and insuring nondiscrimination, and that granting party status to complainant would be incompatible with this role. While
there are some differences between the focus of Title VII as compared to Title VI proceedings, see
Silver, supra note 2, at 506-08, and while the Title VI agency is not compelled to allow a complainant to participate in its proceedings, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41
(1979), none of these differences compel the conclusion that a complainant's participation in Title VI
administrative proceedings can never equal that of a party for purposes of § 1988. The Court in
Cannon recognized the limitations on agencies' abilities to handle all aspects of nondiscrimination
enforcement, 441 U.S. at 708 n.42, and the Crest case is an example of the agency's acceptance-if
not need-for private counsel to play the major role in agency negotiations. See Respondents' Brief
at 11, 34-36, Crest. Nor is there anything that would require a court to award fees if the agency, and
not the complainant, were responsible for the success of the proceedings.
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need not be compensated under section 1988.305 Undoubtedly an individual
who has no attorney has greater access to administrative enforcement processes
than to federal court litigation because of the former's greater informality and
because its processes are not dependent, as are those of the latter, on the expertise and cryptic rules of the bar. One purpose of having administrative agencies
is to increase access to legal processes for those who do not have counsel. Nonetheless, to suggest that the utilization of the administrative processes is not dependent on the availability of personal counsel is insufficient refutation of the
reality that a complainant may use such processes more effectively with coun-

sel's assistance.
Overformalization of the administrative enforcement processes would not
serve the goals of Title VI. I have elsewhere explored and justified the need for
certain informal alternatives to formal litigation to resolve discrimination
problems. 30 6 However, the suggestion that the availability of compensation
under section 1988 for attorneys' services in Title VI administrative proceedings
would undermine the goal of informal resolution of civil rights compliance
problems is at best unpersuasive, at worse, duplicitous. As the risks increase for
a defendant faced with administrative enforcement, its eagerness for early compliance will increase as well. If the only threat is one of litigation, then the defendant will have less incentive to respond sooner rather than later to the
agency's enforcement mechanisms. 30 7 If the complainant's attorney's meter
continues to tick throughout the administrative investigation and subsequent negotiations, the errant defendant may well be more responsive to reasonable settlement than were it to face no exposure for attorneys' fees until the complainant
becomes a plaintiff and files suit.
The Crest majority opinion, by conditioning recovery of attorneys' fees for
work done at the administrative level upon the fortuitous (or intentional) filing
of a suit in federal court to enforce an enumerated civil rights law before the case
is resolved administratively, undermines Congress' expressed interest in increasing access to effective counsel and encouraging the informal resolution of discrimination complaints. What the Court has wrought, let Congress now redress.
V.

THE TASK FOR CONGRESS

When the Court misinterprets a statute Congress can fix it. It did so when
the Court in Smith v. Robinson 308 held that attorneys' fees were not available for
claims under the Education of the Handicapped Act. 30 9 It should do so now to
305. Justice Brennan was, I suggest, guilty of such hyperbole in his dissent in Crest, in suggesting
that "[alan indigent citizen who cannot afford to hire a lawyer to sue to enforce the civil rights laws is
... unable to pursue relief before an administrative agency." Crest, 479 U.S. at 19 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
306. See Silver, supra note 2.
307. Under Title VI, compliance at any stage of the administrative process will avoid termination of federal financial assistance or other sanction. See Silver, supra note 2, at 552.
308. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
309. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982), amended by Handicapped Children's Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99372; see supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
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clarify that sections 1988 and 706(k) allow recovery of attorneys' fees for services rendered in connection with Title V13 10 and Title VII administrative pro-

ceedings, regardless of whether federal litigation is necessary to resolve the
dispute. Parts I-IV of this Article have supplied the justification for such an

amendment, by criticizing the Court's decisions in interpreting section 1988 and
other fee-shifting statutes and demonstrating that allowing fees for cases re-

solved administratively fulfills the goals of federal nondiscrimination laws. Accepting the need for such an amendment, however, does not resolve issues of
exactly what such an amendment should provide, and it is to an exploration of
that question that this Article now turns.
Although I do not intend to suggest that the application of sections 1988
and 706(k) to agency proceedings is more properly accomplished by Congress
than by the courts, Congress nonetheless now has the opportunity to contemplate and resolve certain questions about how the fee issue might be approached
in a way less accessible to the courts. How specific should such a provision be?

Should it provide for fees for attorneys' services rendered at certain stages of the
administrative process, but not for others? Should it require a certain threshold
showing of actual discrimination before such fees would be allowed pursuant to
a settlement agreement? Or should it be stated in language as broad and general

as the language currently in these two fee-shifting statutes?
If limits are to be sought, should Congress impose such limits, or should the
agencies themselves? Perhaps Congress should make a provision for fees gener-

ally, leaving it up to the agencies to articulate through rulemaking the particulars of what services would be covered. Or, in the alternative, perhaps such
issues should be left-as they are currently under sections 1988 and 706(k)-to
the sound discretion of the trial court when requests for fees are presented. For

the reasons developed below, I recommend that Congress amend sections 1988
and 706(k) to provide generally for suits for fees for administratively resolved
cases, leaving it to the agencies to recommend, and the courts to define, the
3 11
appropriate limits of discretion.
310. This assertion is limited to Title VI and the other comparable nondiscrimination statutes
under § 1988, see supra note 17, because of the particular federal administrative mechanisms created
to enforce these statutes. See supra notes 229-45 and accompanying text.
311. Such provisions might read as follows:
§ 1988: In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. A court may awardsuch fee
to a party who has prevailed in an administrative proceeding brought to enforce a claim
under title IX of PublicLaw 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 706(k): In
any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party.. .a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. A court may award suchfee to a
party who has prevailed in any state administrative orjudicial proceedings or proceedings
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought to enforce a claim under
this title.
For consistency, it would then be necessary to amend the corollary provision of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act as well, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). See supra note 17.
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How Particulara Statute?

If Congress so chose, it could particularize the matters for which attorneys'
fees would be available so as to reduce court discretion in setting fee awards.
Congress might do so out of concern that the general availability of fees for
attorneys' work done at the administrative level might encourage the unnecessary involvement of attorneys in relatively straightforward informal agency
processes. For example, Congress could determine that fees should be available
for all work done in connection with formal agency adjudicative proceedings,
and not for work done at informal proceedings. Or Congress might provide fees
for attorneys' services provided after an agency finding of cause or discrimination, but not for services provided before such a finding.
However, both of these distinctions would disserve congressional interest in
informal, negotiated compliance. Any determination that attorneys' fees should
not be available for a stage in an administrative proceeding comparable to a
stage in litigation, such as investigation towards and preparation of the complaint, risks encouraging attorneys to file litigation rather than pursue administrative remedies.
While there may be legitimate need to draw some lines, Congress is probably not the best institution to draw them. The problems with having Congress
make such distinctions are at least twofold. First, Congress is ill-equipped to
engage in the investigation necessary to make such discriminations. Congress
will be forced to explore the intricacies of the various agencies' processes and
procedures in order to make intelligible distinctions. The more detailed the statute, the greater the invitation for debate and disagreement among the legislators
about its particulars. The more debate and disagreement there is, the less likely
it is that an intelligible statute will emerge.
Second, Congress lacks the necessary expertise to do the job well. Legislators are not our best experts on either administrative or judicial processes, or on
which processes are appropriately compensable, and which are not. In promulgating previous fee-shifting statutes such as sections 1988 and 706(k), Congress
painted with a broad brush, leaving the particulars to the sound discretion of the
courts. For all the reasons that Congress frequently delegates to agencies and
courts the responsibility and right to fill in the interstices of broad statutory
schemes, Congress should do so here.
B.

The Agencies as Line-Drawers

At least in the first instance, the enforcement agencies themselves may ap312
propriately suggest the limits of the courts' discretion in awarding fees.
Much as the EEOC has already done in particularizing the scope of the right t6
312. An alternative approach, and one with some merit, would be for Congress to grant to the
agencies themselves the power to make attorneys' fee awards. This would, however, involve a more
radical restructuring of agency powers and responsibilities than the one proposed herein, which
leaves the ultimate authority to grant such awards with the courts. In addition to being less radical,
my proposed amendments so empowering the courts take advantage of the expertise they have developed in fashioning fee awards in civil rights litigation generally.
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recovery of fees in cases brought by federal employees against federal agencies, 3 13 the EEOC and the various civil rights arms of the federal funding agencies could promulgate interpretive regulations clarifying when fees are
appropriately awardable under the corresponding fee-shifting statutes. These
regulations would serve as guidance for the voluntary resolution of the attorneys' fee issue among the parties, as a basis for fee determinations "suggested"

by the agency as part of a negotiated resolution, and, ultimately, as nonbinding
guidance for the court should litigation on the attorneys' fees issue ensue. 3 14
C.

The Courts' Discretion

Once Congress clarifies the power of the courts to award fees for civil rights
cases resolved administratively, whether or not additional guidance is provided
by the agencies, the courts are capable of executing that authority in a manner
consistent with how they have done so previously in litigation arising under sections 1988 and 706(k).

The courts have applied their expertise to judging

whether a plaintiff was a "prevailing party, ' 315 whether a settled claim was nonfrivolous, 3

16

whether certain work was necessary to the success of the litiga-

313. Title VII regulations provide for the possibility of an administrative award of attorneys' fees
for all postfiling, postnotification work for complainants alleging violations of Section 717 of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, relating to discrimination against federal employees. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.271(d)(i) (1988). The regulations provide that "[a] finding of discrimination raises a presumption of entitlement to an award of attorney's fees." Id. When possible, fees are to be agreed
upon by the charging party and the agency representative; if they are unable to agree, then the
agency will make a determination. Id. § 1613.271(d)(2) (amount of awards).
As to the availability of fees for cases resolved short of formal finding, § 1613.271 provides as
follows:

An informal adjustment of a complaint may include an award of... attorney's fees ....

Where the parties agree on an adjustment of the complaint, but cannot agree on whether
attorney's fees or costs should be awarded or on the amount of attorney's fees or costs, the
issue of the award of attorney's fees... may be severed and shall be the subject of a final
decision under § 1613.221(d).
Section 1613.221(d) provides for a determination under § 1613.271(c), adding "In the unusual situation in which the agency determines not to award attorney's fees or costs to a prevailing complainant, the agency shall set forth in its decision the specific reasons for denying the award."
314. While Title VI grants general substantive rulemaking authority to the federal funding agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l, Title VII grants EEOC only authority to promulgate procedural regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12. Although recovery of attorneys' fees may well be deemed procedural in
nature, nonetheless, any agency regulations concerning attorneys' fees should be nonbinding on the
courts. First, under the scheme I have proposed, such fees would be recoverable under § 1988 and
therefore an agency's rulemaking authority arising under Title VI would be irrelevant to any authority under a different statute, even though such statute referred to Title VI. Second, it is inappropriate for the agencies to control what has traditionally-and appropriately-been an area protected
through judicial discretion. While the agency's views on fee recovery as expressed in its regulations
and other pronouncements would and should be highly persuasive, see Skidmore v. Swift and Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), courts should be free to accept or reject an agency's view of the scope and
limits of recoverability. See also Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("Legislative rules... grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant effects on private
interests .... [Non-binding action ... expresses an agency's interpretation, policy, or internal
procedures ....They express the agency's intended course of action, its tentative view of the meaning of a particular statutory term. .. ").
315. See, eg., Hewitt v. Helms, 107 S.Ct. 2672 (1987) (plaintiff, a prisoner who was released
while litigation determining due process and substantive issues under § 1983 was going on, not entitled to fees as "prevailing party" for regulatory change made related to one of his claims regarding
the use of confidential-source information in inmate disciplinary proceedings).
316. See, eg., Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School Dist.v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 52 (1st
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tion, 3 17 as well as the appropriateness of the fee charged and the proper method
for calculation of a fee award.3 18 This same expertise can be brought to bear on
similar issues that may arise in connection with claims asserted for attorneys'
3 19
services at the administrative level.
D. A FinalNote on Line-Drawing
Carey established that because of the integral nature of the state and local
enforcement scheme under Title VII, fees were appropriately awardable under
section 706(k) for attorneys' services performed in connection with such proceedings. This Article previously distinguished the claim in Webb for compensation for state proceedings related to plaintiff's section 1983 claim from the
claim in Crest based on the integral role of Title VI administrative proceedings
in the Title VI scheme. 320 Does this suggest that fees should be awardable
Cir. 1986) (in order to recover fees, plaintiff must show that unadjudicated claim was not "frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless." (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978)).
317. See, eg., Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1983).
318. See, eg., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546
(1987) (holding district court erred in enhancing lodestar fee amount to compensate attorneys for
risk of loss and nonpayment); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 770 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that trial court erred in lowering rates customarily charged by plaintiffs' Washington, D.C. and
New York civil rights lawyers to rates prevailing in South Bend, Indiana), cert denied, 461 U.S. 956
(1983).
319. Courts have already engaged in this process. On assessing the relevance of work done at
the administrative level for purposes of a § 706(k) award for a case ultimately resolved through
arbitration, see Sullivan v. Deptartment of Labor, 663 F.2d 443, 445-47, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1981).
On the issue of fee awards for cases resolved without a finding of discrimination, see, for example, Brown v. Boorstin, 471 F. Supp 56, 56-58 (D.D.C. 1978). This claim arose under § 706(k).
Brown filed both administratively and in federal court, charging racial discrimination. While personnel irregularities were found, no finding of discrimination based on race was ever made, or suggested other than by plaintiff. The court suit was dismissed upon a settlement stipulation
disclaiming any liability for discrimination, and plaintiff applied for fees. Id. at 57. The court rejected the request for fees, holding that despite the liberality in the definition of "prevailing party,"
§ 706(k) does require a threshold finding of some discrimination before a § 706(k) award is appropriate. Id. at 58; see Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975-76 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (denying interim award
claim before discrimination established). Using similar reasoning, courts have declined to grant any
award for negotiated settlements that concede no discrimination. Goodall v. Mason, 419 F. Supp.
980 (E.D. Va. 1976). Brown was not entitled to an award because "[n]either administrative proceedings nor the court-approved settlement reflects any discrimination or concession of discrimination by
the defendant." Brown, 471 F. Supp. at 58. "To penalize employers for beneficially changing employment policies, when no administrator or court has found the practice eliminated by the new
policy was in some fashion used to implement racial discrimination proscribed by Title VII, would
carry the catalyst theory too far." Id.; cf. Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128, 134 (3d
Cir. 1986) (defendant's claim of nuisance value settlement does not preclude award of fees; only
exceptional case would not allow fee award). Since virtually all settlements-whether at the administrative or judicial level--entail a liability disclaimer, the Boorstin approach may go too far in burdening the plaintiff who agrees to settlement. However, legitimate concern about the relationship of
fee-shifting to settlements, see supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text, might suggest that the
presumption be in favor of awarding fees to a party when settlement occurs subsequent to an agency
finding of discrimination, and the presumption be against awarding fees in cases resolved prior to
that point. The latter presumption should be rebuttable upon a demonstration that the complainant's
allegations of discrimination are well-grounded.
For a discussion of where appropriate lines should be drawn regarding the kind of work in
administrative proceedings for which compensation should be awarded, see Carey, 447 U.S. at 71
(fees appropriately awardable for work done in connection with agency investigation and conciliation efforts).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 228-45.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

under the federal civil rights fee-shifting statutes only when utilization of state or
local proceedings is mandated by the particular civil rights act? For reasons
similar to those suggested earlier in rejecting the mandatory/optional distinction
between Title VII and Title VI, I suggest the answer should be no. However,
whether there are any state or local proceedings which can currently be considered "administrative proceedings to enforce a claim under" Title VI is less
clear.3 2 1 Congress has created none. Nonetheless, if the agencies, through their
own cooperative arrangements with the states, should embark on an agreement
to share enforcement responsibilities in overlapping areas, and if such agreements are in furtherance of the policies behind the federal civil rights acts, then I
perceive no reason to exclude the possibility of fee recovery under section 1988
2
for work done in connection with such proceedings. 3 2
Some line drawing is inevitable and appropriate. For example, while allowing such fees might improve access, Congress should not confer jurisdiction
on the courts to award fees to an attorney who never employed any administrative or judicial process in resolving a dispute.323 But whatever lines Congress,
the agencies, and the courts draw, they should draw them to recognize the civil
rights enforcement agency for what it is: a less formal, potentially more expert
and expeditious, congressionally endorsed alternative to our slow, overburdened,
and expensive system of formal justice. Accordingly, attorneys' fees should be
shifted in cases resolved in the administrative arena in a manner comparable to
those resolved in a judicial forum.
CONCLUSION

Congress passed civil rights legislation to eradicate discrimination and to
provide effective redress for acts of discrimination. To help accomplish these
goals, Congress created administrative enforcement agencies and encouraged
them to employ informal processes in attempting to resolve disputes. In addition, Congress promulgated fee-shifting statutes such as sections 706(k) and
1988, so that those endeavoring to redress discrimination would have effective
access, to counsel. However, in its deliberations, Congress never focussed on
whether such fee-shifting was to be available in cases successfully resolved dur321. See supra note 311.
322. For just such reasons, I would neither make explicit reference to state and local administrative proceedings in an amended § 1988, nor limit its coverage to federal administrative proceedings.
See supra note 311. Not every arrangement between the federal agency and the state agency will
warrant a determination that the state proceedings should be treated as administrative proceedings
pursuant to Title VI for purposes of awarding fees.
A number of years ago OCR entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with certain state
agencies relating to compliance reviews conducted of vocational rehabilitation programs. Were any
individual complaints to be resolved by the state or local agencies pursuant to such an arrangement,
award of attorneys' fees might or might not be appropriate, depending on the relationship between
the federal and the state proceedings, and whether the state proceedings were in furtherance of Title
VI.
323. Regulations might provide that fees should only be awardable in cases in which a person
has filed a complaint with the agency. See Mertz v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 1578, 1581 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (no
fees awarded for federal employee Title VII claim resolved in prefiling grievance procedure), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1987).
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ing the administrative proceedings conducted by the agencies it created. By failing to allow the award of attorneys' fees in Title VI cases resolved in federal
administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court has frustrated congressional
purpose.
When the Court recognized in its 1980 Carey decision that fees should be
available under Title VII for attorneys' services in Title VII proceedings at the
state administrative and judicial level whether or not a subsequent court action
was filed, it well served the goals of the 1964 Act. The Court's decision in Carey
appropriately facilitated access to attorneys' services for vindication of valued
rights through both formal and informal processes. By allowing the award of
attorneys' fees for cases resolved administratively, the Court encouraged informal resolution of discrimination complaints without sacrificing effective access
to counsel irrespective of the stage at which such proceedings were resolved.
The Court in Crest failed to think about the problem in a manner consistent
with its analysis in Carey or with Congress' goals in creating the civil rights
statutes. Had it thought about what Congress would have done had Congress
thought about fees for cases resolved administratively, the Court would have
concluded in Crest that section 1988 empowered a district court to award attorneys' fees to a plaintiff who had prevailed on a Title VI complaint filed with a
federal agency charged with enforcing that statute.
Given the Court's failure, and limited hope that it will correct its own error,
the task falls to Congress to amend sections 1988 and 706(k) to provide explicitly for fee-shifting in Title VI and Title VII cases resolved administratively. By
doing so, Congress will ensure that both informal as well as formal avenues to
redress discrimination are open to those aggrieved and that the uphill struggle to
eradicate discrimination based on invidious characteristics such as race, sex,
handicap, and religion, is not hindered further.

